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 Abstract 
Discretion pervades the accounting rules. Proponents argue that allowing discretion enables 
managers to incorporate more information in their disclosures, while opponents believe that 
managers can abuse discretion and engage in earnings management at the expense of 
shareholders. We explicitly model accounting discretion and earnings management in a 
disclosure setting motivated by Shin (1994). We use this setting to study the interaction 
between management’s voluntary disclosure and the subsequent mandatory disclosure of value-
relevant information. We show that, in equilibrium, allowing the manager to have some 
discretion over the mandatory financial reports may enhance the informativeness of the more-
timely voluntary disclosure. However, allowing too much discretion for earnings management 
may result in less informative voluntary disclosure. Thus there may be a hidden benefit of 
granting some (but not too much) discretion in firms’ mandatory financial statements.  
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1. Introduction 
We investigate analytically the interaction between a firm’s voluntary disclosure and the 
subsequent mandatory disclosure of value-relevant information and explore the effect of 
accounting discretion allowed in the mandatory disclosure on the informativeness of the 
voluntary disclosure. We utilize a setting where a firm’s manager has private information about 
the firm’s value that cannot be directly and verifiably communicated to outsiders and introduce 
a new way of modeling accounting discretion. We show that, in equilibrium, allowing the 
manager some discretion over the mandatory financial reports may enhance the informativeness 
of the more timely voluntary disclosure, a counterintuitive result. But we also show that too 
much discretion can render the voluntary disclosure less informative. Thus from the perspective 
of maximizing the informativeness of voluntary disclosure, allowing the manager to manage the 
reported earnings can be beneficial, but there is a maximal amount of discretion that should be 
tolerated, consistent with the discretion embedded in the generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). 
Discretion pervades the accounting rules, as reflected by the wide use of estimates in 
measuring various accounting items (e.g., bad debt expense, contingent liabilities), choice of 
accounting methods for the same economic transactions and assets and liabilities (e.g., straight-
line vs. accelerated depreciation, cost model vs. revaluation model for long-lived assets), etc. 
Proponents argue that such discretion has various benefits. For example, Dutta and Gigler 
(2002), from a contracting perspective, demonstrate that earnings management reduces the cost 
of eliciting truthful voluntary disclosures from managers. Dye (1988) shows that agency 
considerations result in an equilibrium demand for earnings management because compensation 
contracts designed to motivate managerial effort  become more efficient, while Trueman and 
Titman (1988) show that a firm has an incentive to smooth reported earnings when debtholders 
use these reported numbers to estimate the volatility of its earnings. In a related paper, Fishman 
and Hagerty (1990) show in a persuasion game setting that allowing some reporting discretion 
may or may not result in improved informativeness of disclosure, depending on which of the 
two equilibria is chosen. In the papers mentioned above, discretion gives managers the option 
of misreporting what they observe, with arguably desirable results.  
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In a more recent paper, Drymiotes and Hemmer (2013) investigate the role of accruals 
in earnings quality from both valuation and stewardship perspectives. They find that neither an 
“aggressive” nor a “conservative” accrual strategy is optimal. The accrual strategy in their 
setting generates biased earnings numbers ex ante, which differs from the ex post earnings 
management that we focus on. 
Critics complain that discretion enables managers to engage in “earnings management,” 
that is, to use the discretion provided by GAAP to manipulate accounting data and report 
income numbers that reflect managers’ objectives rather than the true economic income 
numbers of firms (Schipper 1989). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
publicly stated that earnings management is one of the greatest evils plaguing the accounting 
profession (Levitt 1998). This concern has been reinforced by such high-profile accounting 
scandals as those at Enron and WorldCom. Empirical studies provide strong evidence that firms 
manage earnings to meet or beat earnings targets, such as last years’ earnings or consensus 
forecasts of earnings provided by financial analysts and firms themselves (see, for example, 
Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999; Bartov et. al. 2002).1 This line of research 
argues that earnings management decreases investor confidence and undermines the credibility 
of accounting reports. To date, there has been a lack of systematic studies on the benefit-cost 
tradeoff of allowing some degree of discretion in accounting rules in the presence of both 
voluntary and mandatory disclosures.2  
 The empirical literature indicates that earnings management is strongly related to 
earnings forecasts (e.g., Degeorge et al. 1999) and that voluntary disclosure and mandatory 
financial reports complement each other because the primarily backward-looking and less 
timely mandatory reports encourage managers to disclose voluntarily (and credibly) their 
forward-looking and timely private information (Ball et al. 2012). However, there is little 
research so far that simultaneously examines managers’ voluntary earnings forecasts and the 
                                                          
1Other examples include Carter et al. (2007) and Roychowdhury (2006). Carter et al. (2007) document that firms 
facing financial reporting concerns, such as meeting or beating earnings benchmarks and avoiding violation of debt 
covenants, overused stock options to compensate their employees before the enactment of SFAS 123R, which 
required the expensing of stock options. Roychowdhury (2006) provides evidence consistent with managers 
manipulating real activities (e.g., offering price discounts to temporarily increase sales or overproducing to report 
lower cost of goods sold) to avoid reporting annual losses or to meet annual analyst forecasts. 
2 Dye and Verrecchia (1995), in a principal-agent setting, study the effect of allowing managerial discretion in 
reporting current period expenses. They show this can be desirable sometimes and undesirable other times. Fischer 
and Verrecchia (2000), Sankar and Subramanyam (2001), and Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005, 2013) study the 
effect of accounting discretion on the properties of mandatory accounting reports in market settings. 
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subsequent management of the mandatorily announced earnings. The voluntary and mandatory 
disclosures made by managers, as well as the equilibrium price response to them, are 
endogenously determined. Thus if there are relationships among them, they must be shown to 
hold in equilibrium. In fact, Ball et al. (2012) strongly assert that the economic roles of 
(audited) mandatory and (unaudited) voluntary disclosures cannot be evaluated separately. 
Beyer et al. (2010) also emphasize the need for models to examine voluntary and mandatory 
disclosures simultaneously.3 We respond to such calls and propose an analytical model that 
jointly determines the equilibrium voluntary and mandatory disclosures. We also propose a new 
approach of modeling accounting discretion and study how discretion affects the properties of 
disclosures.  
 Our model is motivated by the model of Shin (1994). Early voluntary disclosure 
literature generally assumes that the manager is either uninformed or perfectly informed (e.g., 
Grossman 1981; Dye 1985; Jung and Kwon 1988). This stream of work demonstrates that, in 
equilibrium, the manager either discloses the entire truth or keeps silent. Shin (1994) studies a 
setting in which the manager simultaneously learns both good and bad news and shows that the 
optimal disclosure strategy is the “sanitization strategy,” that is, disclosing only good news (the 
lower bound of the firm’s value that can be justified by his signals) and withholding all bad 
news (the upper bound of the firm’s value that can be justified by his signals). Shin (1994) 
introduces imprecision to the manager’s information set; that is, the manager learns a possible 
set (or a range) of values that the underlying “true” earnings will fall in, and as a result, his 
voluntary disclosure can be interpreted as either a range or a point disclosure and does not have 
to be the entire truth. This feature is empirically appealing, and our setting allows us to preserve 
this interpretation of the manager’s voluntary disclosure. We build our model using the private 
information structure similar to Shin’s (1994), but we relax the assumption that the true 
earnings is verifiable, thus allowing the manager to manage the reported earnings when 
necessary.  
 Specifically, the manager of a firm observes privately some information regarding the 
firm’s “true” earnings (i.e., the possible values that the “true” earnings might take and the 
                                                          
3 “[We] encourage researchers to investigate the interplay between management forecasts and mandatory 
disclosures in general … [It] would be useful to combine analyses of voluntary disclosures with mandatory 
disclosure to investigate … the extent to which mandatory disclosure requirements affect … the amount of 
voluntary disclosures” (Beyer et al. 2010, 314). 
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probability that each of these values will be realized). The nature of the true earnings and the 
private information that the manager receives depend on his ability, with the manager of higher 
ability being more likely to generate higher true earnings and potentially more likely to observe 
more precise private information about true earnings. The manager is not aware of his ability 
level before working for the firm and may (partially) learn his ability level when private signals 
are realized. The manager has the option to make a voluntary disclosure of the expected 
earnings based on his private information, before his mandatory report of the firms’ earnings 
after learning the realization of the true earnings. The firm is then sold to a new investor based 
on the voluntary and mandatory disclosures. The manager chooses both the voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure strategies to maximize a weighted average of the selling price of the firm 
and the market’s perception of his ability. We assume that the true earnings can be observed 
only by the manager and is never observed by the outside investor, at least during the 
manager’s horizon. What the outside investor observes are the voluntary disclosure and the 
reported earnings, which can be managed by the manager. We assume that, given the discretion 
that the manager has over the accounting report, he incurs no cost for managing the reported 
earnings, but earnings management may not be successful (i.e., the manager fails to make the 
reported earnings to reach the prior set target). In such cases, the manager will incur an 
(endogenous) penalty in that the market will perceive him to be more likely of low ability. We 
interpret the ex-ante probability of successful earnings management as the discretion granted by 
GAAP to the manager. In other words, for a given amount of earnings management, higher 
probability of successful earnings management indicates more discretion for the manager.4  
We show that, relaxing the maintained assumption in the prior disclosure literature that 
the manager cannot manage the reported earnings in a setting of a joint determination of 
voluntary and mandatory disclosures can generate interesting insights. Specifically, allowing a 
limited degree of discretion to the manager to manage the mandatorily reported earnings can 
lead to the manager incorporating more private information in his voluntary disclosure. The 
intuition underlying this result is as follows. If the manager is given no discretion so that any 
attempt to manage earnings is blocked, he is then “forced” to disclose the lower bound of his 
                                                          
4 The term “discretion” refers to practices allowed under the accounting rules that can potentially affect reported 
earnings, e.g., straight-line versus accelerated depreciation methods, not practices that are considered outright 
fraud, e.g., forged bank accounts.  
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observed information set, regardless of his knowledge about the probability distribution of the 
true earnings on this set because of the penalty arising from the market’s perception that the 
manager is of low ability when the voluntary and mandatory disclosures are inconsistent. For 
example, suppose that, before the realization of the true earnings, the manager knows that the 
probability distribution of the true earnings is skewed to the right so that the true earnings 
number is likely to be high. However, the manager cannot rule out the possibility that earnings 
may turn out to be low, although he knows this is unlikely. Because the manager cannot afford 
to voluntarily disclose a number that has any chance of being short of the realization, despite it 
being extremely unlikely, he can only make the disclosure that earnings will be above the lower 
bound of the support of the earnings distribution that he has privately learned. Thus much of 
what the manager knows (i.e., the distribution) cannot be communicated.  
Now, suppose that the realization of the true earnings is not mechanically revealed but is 
reported by the manager and the report is subject to management with some probability of 
success. Given the feasibility of managing the subsequent mandatory reports, the earlier 
forecast of earnings provided by the manager would depend crucially upon the probability 
distribution of the true earnings the manager privately knows. If this probability distribution is 
sufficiently skewed to the right, the manager would communicate a higher earnings forecast to 
inflate the price of the firm. He would do this knowing that the chance of the true earnings 
falling below the forecast would be small and therefore the chances of managing the reported 
earnings and incurring a penalty when the earnings management is unsuccessful would also be 
small. Thus allowing the manager some discretion to manage the reported earnings can lead to a 
(counterintuitive) result: the earlier voluntary forecast of earnings reveals more of the 
manager’s private information—the probability distribution of the earnings.  
This intuition, however, does not hold at the other extreme. When the manager is 
granted too much discretion, he can almost always manage the reported earnings to a target 
level with no reference to the true earnings. As a result, he will always voluntarily disclose that 
the earnings number is high, regardless of his private information. The voluntary disclosure will 
then have no information content. Thus an intermediate degree of discretion allows for the 
maximum informativeness of voluntary disclosure.5 
                                                          
5 Beyer et al. (2010) document that a great majority of the firm-provided financial information is conveyed through 
managers’ voluntary disclosure. Thus improving the informativeness of voluntary disclosure is potentially 
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Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we uncover a hidden 
benefit to earnings management, thus providing some rationale for the allowance of discretion 
imbedded in GAAP. In this sense, our paper adds to the literature on the desirability of some 
tolerance for earnings management, although we derive this intuition in a market setting as 
opposed to an agency setting, as in Arya et al. (1998), Dutta and Gigler (2002) and Arya et al. 
(2003). Sankar and Subramanyam (2001) consider a two-period model and focus on mandatory 
disclosure with the possibility that part of the earnings management has to be reversed in the 
second period, whereas we focus on a single period and show that discretion results in the 
manager incorporating private information in voluntary disclosure without such reversal. 
Stocken and Verrecchia (2004), and Ewert and Wagenhafer (2013) introduce nonfinancial 
information privately owned by a manager that can at most be partially captured by the firm’s 
accounting system. The former show that a privately informed manager may endogenously 
choose an imprecise accounting system and the efficiency of this choice depends on the 
usefulness of accounting information. The latter show that, under certain conditions, less 
discretion allowed in reporting earnings reduces earnings quality. Both papers focus on 
mandatory disclosure, while we consider both mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Finally, 
Fishman and Hagerty (1990) study the effect of discretion on the property of disclosure. 
However, in their model, there is only one managerial disclosure decision, and the discretion 
allowed is directly over that single disclosure. The manager also is required to disclose a signal 
from a pre-specified subset of available signals (which makes the disclosure more of a 
mandatory one in nature). Thus the disclosure itself must be truthful. The authors are therefore 
silent about the interaction between the two distinct forms of disclosure that are central to 
accounting. Our contribution is to demonstrate the desirability of granting the manager 
discretion over his mandatory disclosure as it enhances the informativeness of the more timely 
voluntary disclosure.  
Second, we jointly study voluntary and mandatory disclosures, while focusing on the 
interaction between those two types of disclosures. Our result shows that investigating the 
                                                          
important for resource allocation in capital markets. We do not directly model investment. Rather we focus on how 
the interaction of mandatory and voluntary disclosures affects the informativeness of voluntary disclosure, a first 
and necessary step leading to the real implications of such an interaction. Also although allowing discretion may 
improve the informativeness of voluntary disclosure, it decreases the informativeness of mandatory disclosure. We 
do not examine the overall informativeness of the two disclosures. So long as the informativeness of voluntary 
disclosure is sufficiently important, allowing some degree of discretion can be beneficial.  
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desirability of accounting discretion in the sole framework of earnings management and 
whether it impairs the integrity of mandatory disclosures can be misleading, because 
prohibiting the management of mandatory reports can have some unintended consequences for 
the voluntary disclosures. We propose that studies of the benefits or costs of earnings 
management should jointly consider the tradeoff between those two types of disclosures.  
Einhorn and Ziv (2012) examine a double-tier disclosure decision and explore the 
interactions between the decision to disclose and the bias in the disclosure if it is made. The two 
dimensions of disclosures are assumed to be made simultaneously in their model, which ignores 
the potential disciplinary effect of subsequent mandatory disclosure has on the voluntary 
disclosure that we focus on. 6 Kwon et al. (2009) explicitly model such an effect. However, in 
their model, mandatory disclosure cannot be managed. Several other papers maintain the 
assumption that mandatory disclosure cannot be managed or management (if allowed) of 
mandatory disclosure may be detected and penalized and demonstrate that the credibility of 
voluntary disclosure can be sustained (Sansing 1992; Stocken 2000; Lundholm 2003; Korn 
2004). Beyer (2009) also jointly studies managers’ optimal voluntary and mandatory disclosure 
strategies in a setting where the capital market is ignorant of both the mean and the variance of 
firms’ underlying cash flows. However, her focus is on the properties of capital market 
responses, while ours is on the properties of managers’ disclosures and, in particular, the 
relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Other related studies include 
Einhorn (2005), Bagnoli and Watts (2007), and Beyer and Guttman (2012), where voluntary 
disclosures are required to be truthful. Stocken (2013) provides a synthesized review of the 
theoretical literature on managers’ strategic voluntary disclosure as the scope of discretion 
retained by managers varies from zero to infinity. A closely related paper is Boisits (2013), who 
studies the interplay between the two forms of disclosures by restricting to a constant bias 
mandatory reporting strategy and imposing two exogenous costs related to the disclosures to the 
model: 1) cost as a function of the difference between voluntary and mandatory disclosures and 
2) cost as a function of the bias in mandatory disclosure. We endogenously derive the cost of 
                                                          
6 We thank Phil Stocken for pointing this out.  
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discrepancy between the voluntary and mandatory disclosures,7 and we impose no constraint on 
the form of mandatory disclosure.  
By investigating the interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosures, we also 
add to the literature on the economic role of accounting disclosures. In this regard, we take the 
same stand as Gigler and Hemmer (1998) and Gigler and Jiang (2015). Their studies emphasize 
the “confirmatory role” of mandatory accounting reports: by providing backward-looking 
information, they confirm the credibility of firms’ more timely voluntary disclosures of 
forward-looking information. This view is empirically supported by Ball et al. (2012) and is 
strongly advocated by Ball et al. (2012) and Beyer et al. (2010). Our paper further shows that, 
even though limiting managers’ discretion over financial reporting strengthens the 
“confirmatory role” of the mandatory reports, overly restricting managers’ reporting behavior 
can lead to decreased informativeness of the voluntary disclosures. This is new in the literature.  
Prior accounting studies on voluntary disclosure assume that any managerial disclosure 
can be costlessly and immediately verified by external parties but that a claim of ignorance 
cannot be verified. They demonstrate that, in equilibrium, the manager either discloses the 
entire truth or only discloses if the earnings news is sufficiently good (e.g., Grossman 1981; 
Verrecchia 1983; Dye 1985; Jung and Kwon 1988; Shin 1994). These studies show that 
voluntary disclosures are themselves managed, but they do not investigate the strategic 
interaction between voluntary disclosures and the mandatory disclosures that follow, because 
they assume that voluntary disclosures can be verified by the subsequent mandatory disclosure 
and that the mandatory disclosure cannot be managed. We relax this assumption and show that 
introducing such an important institutional feature of accounting generates interesting novel 
insights.  
             Third, we introduce a new way of modelling accounting discretion. The traditional 
earnings management literature assumes that earnings management is costly and the cost is 
commonly modeled as the (squared) distance between the true earnings and the reported 
earnings multiplied by a multiplier where the multiplier captures the notion of accounting 
discretion or enforcement of accounting rules (e.g., Fischer and Verrecchia 2000; Ewert and 
                                                          
7 Most of the studies assume an exogenous cost if voluntary disclosure differs from the mandatory disclosure. 
Notable exceptions are Stocken (2000) and Lundholm (2003), who endogenize the cost in a repeated game setting. 
Beyer and Guttman (2012) introduce (endogenous) real costs to discipline the voluntary disclosure. 
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Wagenhofer 2005; Beyer 2009). Our setting allows us to break down the earnings management 
cost as traditionally modeled into two components: the ex ante assessed probability that the 
earnings management may not succeed and the ex post cost (endogenously imposed by the 
market) that the manager may incur if the mandatorily reported accounting number falls below 
the voluntarily disclosed earnings number. We interpret the first component as the discretion 
granted by GAAP to the manager over financial reporting. In other words, for a given amount 
of earnings management, higher probability of successful earnings management indicates that 
more discretion is allowed to the manager. We believe such a characterization of accounting 
discretion better captures the institutional features of GAAP and also that distinguishing 
between these two components of the cost associated with earnings management helps to better 
understand the role of accounting discretion in the interaction between voluntary and mandatory 
disclosures. 
 Finally, our paper also provides some novel—and potentially testable—empirical 
implications regarding the relationship between earnings management and voluntary disclosure. 
The implication that the discretion embedded in the accounting rules could be positively 
associated with the price informativeness of voluntary disclosure has, to the best of our 
knowledge, not been tested.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model setup. Section 
3 defines and derives the equilibrium disclosure strategy and market response of the model. 
Section 4 discusses potential extensions of the baseline model and some empirical implications, 
and Section 5 concludes. The appendix contains all the proofs.  
 
2. The Model 
We consider a pure exchange economy. There is a risk-neutral manager who runs the 
firm, and a risk-neutral investor who owns one share of the firm. For exogenous reasons (for 
example, liquidity needs), the investor needs to sell, to a new risk-neutral investor, the share 
before consuming the true income of the firm. Disclosure thus plays a role in determining the 
selling price. There are two states of nature, denoted by H and L, respectively. The firm is 
endowed with a project that generates underlying unmanaged true earnings of ix  in state i, 
where i = H or L. Without loss of generality, we assume that LH xx  , that is, state H is 
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considered more favorable than state 𝐿. The prior probabilities of the firm being in states H and 
𝐿 are denoted as Hp  and )1( HL pp  respectively. The manager can potentially privately 
observe a signal, ?̃?, that is perfectly informative of the true earnings in that the signal ?̃? maps 
from the state space to the set {0,1} that satisfies 
𝜎(𝑗) = {
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑗 ∈ {𝐿}
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 ∈ {𝐻}
.                     (1) 
The probability of observing ?̃? depends on the manager’s ability to be specified below. When the 
manager does not observe ?̃?, we assume that he observes a noisy signal ?̃? ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙} that is 
informative of the underlying state in the following manner: 
𝑝(𝑠 = ℎ|𝑖 = 𝐻) = 𝑝(𝑠 = 𝑙|𝑖 = 𝐿) = 𝑞 ∈ (
1
2
, 1).                                                                   (2) 
Note that equation (1) is a binary version of the signal structure in Shin (1994). When the 
manager observes ?̃?, he knows the underlying state perfectly. When the manager does not learn  
?̃?, he still possesses more information, albeit noisy, about the underlying state. We further 
assume that the manager cannot credibly convey ?̃? and ?̃? to the public directly due to their 
nonverifiable nature. Other than the manager’s observed signal (?̃? or ?̃?) and, later on, the 
realized true earnings, everything else is common knowledge. Our introduction of the noisy 
signals observed by the manager is a parsimonious way of introducing one of the key features 
of our model: even if the manager does not know the underlying state precisely, he may still 
possess more information than outside investors about what the true earnings will be. 
We assume there are three levels of managerial ability 𝑎1(𝑞) ≤ 𝑎2 < 𝑎3. The manager 
does not know his ability before he operates the firm and he may (partially) learn of his type 
from observing 𝜎 or 𝑠. The manager of the highest ability, 𝑎3, generates 𝑥𝐻, whereas a lower 
type manager (𝑎2 or 𝑎1(𝑞)) generates 𝑥𝐿. Furthermore, while manager of 𝑎2 observes 𝜎 = 0 so 
that he is sure that 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿, the manager of the lowest ability, 𝑎1(𝑞), only observes signal ?̃?. The 
highest ability manager observes either 𝜎 = 1 or ?̃?.  These assumptions capture the idea that 
managerial ability consists of two parts: the ability to generate (1) high earnings and (2) 
important internal information useful for decision-making. The manager who generates low 
earnings but can identify it earlier is conceived to have better ability than the manager who 
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generates low earnings but fails to identify it timely due to low quality internal information. We 
further assume that lim
𝑞→1
𝑎1(𝑞) = 𝑎2, that is, when 𝑠 becomes perfectly informative about the 
underlying state, the manager can always identify the true earnings earlier. We suppress the 
dependence of 𝑎1 on 𝑞 in subsequent analysis as our results hold for any 𝑞 ∈ (
1
2
, 1).8 
Conditional on ?̃?, the probability that the manager observes ?̃? is 𝜃. Thus the prior probability of 
manager’s ability being 𝑎1, 𝑎2, and 𝑎3 is 𝑝𝐿(1 − 𝜃), 𝑝𝐿𝜃, and 𝑝𝐻, respectively.  
           After observing the private signal, the manager has the option to issue a voluntary 
disclosure, 𝐷. Because the state of nature is binary, there are two possible voluntary 
disclosures: }{ LL xxD  , interpreted in equilibrium as earnings is at least Lx  as in Shin 
(1994), and 𝐷𝐻 ≡  {𝑥 ≥ 𝑥𝐻}, interpreted as earnings is at least Hx (which, in our case, is 
equivalent to 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻).
9 The true earnings number is then realized and is privately observed by 
the manager. The manager then issues a mandatory disclosure, 𝑅 ∈ {𝑅𝐻, 𝑅𝐿}, where 𝑅𝐻 ≡ {𝑥 =
𝑥𝐻} and 𝑅𝐿 ≡ {𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿}. We depart from the prior literature by assuming that true earnings 
cannot be observed or verified by anybody, at least during the manager’s horizon, which is not 
unreasonable because (1) accounting involves accruals and deferrals that make the underlying 
earnings generating process not so transparent, and (2) the manager’s horizon is generally 
shorter than that of a firm. Thus we explicitly allow the manager to be able to manage the 
mandatory disclosure with some probability of success. For example, if the manager voluntarily 
discloses 𝐷𝐻, while the true earnings turns out to be 𝑥𝐿, the manager then has two options: he 
can choose not to manage the mandatory disclosure and announce  𝑅 = 𝑅𝐿, or he can choose to 
engage in earnings management that can with some probability increase the reported earnings 
to 𝑅𝐻. We assume that the probability of successfully managing earnings up from 𝑅𝐿 to 𝑅𝐻 is a 
constant 𝛿 ∈ [0,1). We use 𝑚(𝐷, 𝑥, 𝑅) ∈ {0,1} to denote the manager’s earnings management 
strategies with  𝑚(𝐷, 𝑥, 𝑅) = 0(1) denoting no earnings management (earnings management). 
We also assume that the manager can always manage earnings down with probability 1. The 
                                                          
8 Alternatively, we can assume that the manager chooses 𝑞 subject to a cost of 𝑐(𝑞) and that his objective is to 
maximize firm’s selling price plus his perceived ability minus 𝑐(𝑞). So long as 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑞→1
𝑐(𝑞) = +∞, we will have an 
interior solution of 𝑞, and our main results remain qualitatively unchanged.  
9 The manager can also choose to keep silent. In our model remaining silent is equivalent to disclosing 𝐷𝐿. As in 
Shin (1994), it can also be verified that the manager will never find it optimal to disclose only the upper bound of 
the earnings, that is, earnings is at most 𝑥𝐻  or 𝑥𝐿. 
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manager chooses 𝐷, 𝑅, and 𝑚 to maximize ];,|[);,( mRDaEmRDP  , that is, the weighted 
sum of the selling price of the firm and his perceived ability by the capital market, where 𝜆 > 0 
represents the relative weight on the perceived ability, given the manager’s disclosures.10  One 
way to interpret the objective function is that the first term represents current compensation and 
the second one captures future compensation determined by perceived managerial ability. 
The timeline of the model is summarized as follows. 
Date 0: Nature chooses the manager’s type. The underlying state 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿} and the realizations 
of ?̃? and (possibly) ?̃? are then determined based on manager’s type and equations (1) and (2).  
Date 1: The manager (possibly) makes a voluntary disclosure, 𝐷, regarding the firms’ future 
true earnings. The firm’s true earnings number is realized and observed by the manager. The 
manager then issues a mandatory disclosure of the firm’s earnings, 𝑅, that is subject to potential 
management, 𝑚, by the manager with some success probability. The firm is then sold to a new 
investor. The manager chooses 𝐷, 𝑅, and 𝑚 to maximize ] ;,|[) ;,( mRDaEmRDP  . 
Date 3: The new investor consumes firm’s true earnings.  
It is worth elaborating on how we model earnings management in the presence of 
discretion granted by GAAP. Our formulation relates to but differs somewhat from the 
literature’s usual assumption of an upfront earnings management cost (e.g., Fischer and Stocken 
2004; Guttman et al. 2006; Beyer 2009). Departing from the formulation of direct upfront 
earnings management cost that summarizes into a single term both the constraint imposed by 
the accounting rules and the expected adverse consequences, our formulation allows for a focus 
on the first component, that is, the constraint imposed by the accounting rules. This is modelled 
by the success probability 𝛿 of managing reported earnings upward. This success probability 
represents the discretion allowed in the accounting rules in the sense that more discretion 
increases the probability of successful earnings management (see, e.g., Chen et al. 2007; Gao 
2013; and Laux and Stocken 2012). To illustrate this point, consider the example of revenue 
recognition. Suppose that the accounting rule stipulates revenue is only recognized when cash is 
                                                          
10 Throughout the paper, we use the upper case letter P to represent the price response and the lower case letter p to 
represent probability.  
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received. Since the amount of revenue recognized must equal the amount of cash received, 
without altering the timing and amount of the flow of cash, the probability that the manager can 
manage revenue up is zero, corresponding to an accounting rule with zero discretion. On the 
other hand, suppose that the accounting rule allows the manager to estimate the amount of cash 
to be received as the recognized amount of revenue. The manager can then increase his estimate 
to recognize a higher revenue number without managing the real cash flow, which corresponds 
to an accounting rule with some discretion. However, because earnings numbers reflect both 
operational uncertainties and reporting constraints imposed by accounting rules, the manager 
may not always be able to manage the reported earnings to achieve his target. Thus we assume 
that he has a success probability of less than one and that this probability is an increasing 
function of the amount of discretion allowed in the accounting rules. We model the second 
component as the perceived ability of the manager after both the voluntary and mandatory 
disclosures. This perceived ability (endogenously) captures the ex-post consequences borne by 
the manager when the mandatory disclosure is inconsistent with the preceding voluntary 
disclosure. We believe the separation of the two components is particularly relevant in our 
setting and allows us to isolate the effect of the ex ante discretion allowed in accounting rules 
on the manager’s disclosure strategies from the interference of the ex post consequences.  
In the next section, we solve for the equilibrium (pure strategy) voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure strategies of the manager and illustrate our central message: allowing 
some degree of discretion in the mandatory disclosure can enhance the informativeness of the 
voluntary disclosure, but allowing too much discretion undercuts the informativeness of the 
voluntary disclosure. Appendix A summarizes the notations used in this paper.    
3. Managers’ Optimal Voluntary and Mandatory Disclosure Strategies 
Denote Ω as manager’s information set before making voluntary disclosure. From the 
discussion above the manager observes either ?̃? or ?̃?. Let 𝐸[. ] and 𝑝(. ) be the expectation and 
probability operators respectively. The Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game is defined as 
follows. 
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Definition: A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium contains the manager’s voluntary disclosure strategy, 
𝐷(Ω), mandatory disclosure strategy, 𝑅(𝐷, 𝑥), earnings management strategy 𝑚(𝐷, 𝑥, 𝑅) ∈
{0,1}, and the market’s pricing rule at the mandatory disclosure date, 𝑃(𝐷, 𝑅; 𝑚), such that: 
(i) 𝐷(𝛺), 𝑅(𝐷, 𝑥), and 𝑚(𝐷, 𝑥, 𝑅) maximize the manager’s expected payoff, 
𝐸[?̂?(𝐷, 𝑅; 𝑚)] + ];,|[ mRDaE , where ?̂?(𝐷, 𝑅; 𝑚) is the manager’s conjecture 
about the investors’ pricing rule in response to the voluntary and mandatory 
disclosures and the manager’s earnings management strategy; 
(ii) The risk-neutral investor sets up 𝑃 (𝐷, ?̂?(𝐷, 𝑥);  ?̂?(𝐷, 𝑥, 𝑅)) =
𝐸 (?̃?|𝐷, ?̂?(𝐷, 𝑥); ?̂?(𝐷, 𝑥, 𝑅)) after observing 𝐷, where ?̂? and ?̂? are the investor’s 
conjectures about the manager’s mandatory disclosure and earnings management 
strategy, respectively;  
(iii) );,(ˆ);,( mRDPmRDP  , ?̂?(𝐷, 𝑥) = 𝑅(𝐷, 𝑥), and ?̂?(𝐷, 𝑥, 𝑅) = 𝑚(𝐷, 𝑥, 𝑅), i.e., in 
equilibrium, the conjectured pricing rule and mandatory disclosure and earnings 
management strategies are consistent with the actual pricing rules and mandatory 
disclosure and earnings management strategies;  
(iv) The conditional distribution of 𝑅 on 𝑥 is consistent with the manager’s mandatory 
disclosure strategy, 𝑅(𝐷, 𝑥), and his earnings management strategy m(D, x, R), i.e., 
p(𝑅 = 𝑅𝐻|𝑅(𝐷, 𝑥𝐻) = 𝑅𝐻, 𝑚) = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝(𝑅 = 𝑅𝐿|𝑅(𝐷, 𝑥𝐿) = 𝑅𝐿 , 𝑚) = 1 ∀𝐷, 𝑚; 
and, p(𝑅 = 𝑅𝐻|𝑅(𝐷, 𝑥𝐿) = 𝑅𝐻 , 𝑚 = 1) = 𝛿 and p(𝑅 = 𝑅𝐿|𝑅(𝐷, 𝑥𝐿) = 𝑅𝐻 , 𝑚 = 1) =
1 − 𝛿  ∀𝐷.  
Before continuing our discussion of equilibrium, we would like to remind the readers of 
one feature of our model. Since manager’s payoff is determined by the market’s perception of 
managerial ability, we would have multiple equilibria in the following sense: given any 
equilibrium voluntary disclosure strategy, one can switch the strategies and get the same 
equilibrium with a corresponding switch of market’s beliefs. For example, suppose the 
following is an equilibrium strategy: the manager discloses 𝐷𝐻 when observing 𝜎 = 1 and 
discloses 𝐷𝐿 otherwise, and market believes that 𝐷𝐻 comes from a manager who observes 𝜎 =
1 and that 𝐷𝐿 comes from a manager who observes anything other than 𝜎 = 1. Then the 
following is also an equilibrium: the manager discloses 𝐷𝐿 when observing 𝜎 = 1 and discloses 
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𝐷𝐻 otherwise, and market believes that 𝐷𝐿 comes from a manager who observes 𝜎 = 1 and that 
𝐷𝐻 comes from a manager who observes anything other than 𝜎 = 1. Those two equilibria are 
essentially the same in terms of the price informativeness of disclosure and managerial payoff. 
This multiplicity stems from the fact that market can assign 𝐷𝐻 to be associated with better 
news than 𝐷𝐿 or vice versa. To remove this type of multiplicity, we only focus on equilibria 
where 𝐷𝐻 is associated with no worse news than 𝐷𝐿, denoted as 𝑃(𝐷𝐻) ≥ 𝑃(𝐷𝐿). Our 
subsequent discussions will be based on this simplification. Proposition 1 characterizes all pure 
strategy equilibria when no discretion is allowed.   
Proposition 1: When no discretion is allowed over mandatory disclosure, i.e., 𝛿 = 0, there are 
two pure strategy equilibria: (1) the “uninformative equilibrium” in which  the  manager 
chooses the same voluntary disclosure strategy regardless of the signal; and 2) the 
“sanitization equilibrium” in which the manager chooses to disclose 𝐷𝐻 whenever 𝜎 = 1 and 
to disclose 𝐷𝐿 otherwise. However, neither of the equilibria survives the intuitive criterion (Cho 
and Kreps 1987). 
Proof: All proofs are in Appendix B.  
Proposition 1 says that there are two pure strategy equilibria when 𝛿 = 0. In the 
uninformative equilibrium, manager of all types makes the same voluntary disclosure, and the 
investor ignores the manager’s disclosure (so the manager is indifferent between disclosing 𝐷𝐻 
or disclosing 𝐷𝐿, regardless of his private information). This makes voluntary disclosure 
uninformative. The “sanitization equilibrium” follows from Shin (1994) and refers to a situation 
where the manager discloses the lower bound of his private information. For example, the 
manager discloses 𝐷𝐿 so long as he knows that true earnings can be 𝑥𝐿 for a nonzero 
probability. In our setting, as long as the manager does not observe 𝜎 = 1, he cannot rule out 
the case that true earnings could be 𝑥𝐿. This is true even when he observes 𝑠 = ℎ, which can 
indicate that true earnings are very likely to be 𝑥𝐻 if 𝑞 is sufficiently large. Thus the sanitization 
equilibrium in our setting refers to the equilibrium where the manager discloses 𝐷𝐻 only when 
𝜎 = 1 and 𝐷𝐿 otherwise. The intuition for such a strategy to be an equilibrium strategy is as 
follows. Investor’s perception of managerial ability is based on 𝐷 and 𝑅. Since the manager of 
higher ability tends to issue 𝐷 and 𝑅 that are more likely to be consistent with each other (i.e., 
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𝑅 = 𝑅𝐻 when 𝐷 = 𝐷𝐻, and 𝑅 = 𝑅𝐿 when 𝐷 = 𝐷𝐿), the investor will perceive the inconsistency 
between 𝐷 and 𝑅 as from a manager of the lowest ability (i.e., 𝑎 = 𝑎1), resulting in an 
(endogenous) penalty to the manager. The manager whose private information indicates a low 
probability of true earnings being 𝑥𝐻 will want to disclose 𝐷𝐿 to avoid being conceived as the 
lowest ability manager. Thus sanitization strategy can be supported in equilibrium.  
However, both pure strategy equilibria can be eliminated by the intuitive criterion 
proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987) (hereafter referred to as the intuitive criterion). In particular, 
while the sanitization equilibrium can be sustained by proper out-of-equilibrium beliefs as 
illustrated in Shin (1994) due to the exogenous nature of the penalty for mismatches between 
voluntary and mandatory disclosures, it does not survive the intuitive criterion in our setting. 
The reason is that the penalty in our setting is endogenous and stems from the market’s 
perception of managerial ability, which depends on the market’s beliefs, including out-of-
equilibrium beliefs. When the manager uses the sanitization strategy, {𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿} is on the off-
equilibrium path. Since 𝑅𝐿 indicates that managerial ability is either 𝑎1 or 𝑎2, 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿] will 
be a probability-weighted average of  𝑎1 and 𝑎2. The manager who observes 𝜎 = 0 knows that 
his ability is 𝑎2. He thus has an incentive to send an off-equilibrium message 𝐷𝐻 and increase 
𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻, 𝑅𝐿] to 𝑎2. This implies that no out-of-equilibrium beliefs will support the sanitization 
equilibrium while at the same time satisfying the intuitive criterion. Similarly, the completely 
uninformative equilibrium can be eliminated by the intuitive criterion, as the manager who 
observes 𝜎 = 1 has an incentive to deviate and increase market’s perceived ability of him.  
Nevertheless, we still use the sanitization equilibrium as a benchmark in our future 
discussion of price informativeness of voluntary disclosure because this is the equilibrium that 
yields a higher price informativeness when no discretion is allowed. Thus, if we could show 
that the equilibrium in the presence of discretion generates more informative voluntary 
disclosure than the sanitization equilibrium, then allowing discretion increases the 
informativeness of voluntary disclosure unambiguously. Note that, in the sanitization 
equilibrium, the manager chooses 𝐷𝐿 whenever 𝜎 is not 1, even when he has favorable private 
information (i.e., observing 𝑠 = ℎ). As we will see below, this results in potentially large 
information loss in his voluntary disclosure when the private signal is sufficiently informative, 
that is, when 𝑞 is sufficiently large.  
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We now examine the case where discretion is allowed, that is, 𝛿 > 0. Since the manager 
can manage earnings, there are more strategies available to him and potentially more possible 
pure strategy equilibria. Proposition 2 shows that, among the four possible pure strategy 
equilibria, three can be eliminated by suitable selection criteria. This leaves us with only one 
pure strategy equilibrium, denoted as “separation with management equilibrium,” which will be 
our focus for subsequent discussions.  
Proposition 2: Denote 𝑘 ≡
𝑥𝐻−𝑥𝐿+𝜆(𝑎3−𝑎2)
𝜆(𝑎2−𝑎1)
. When discretion is allowed, there are four 
possible pure strategy equilibria. 
1. There always exists an equilibrium, denoted as “uninformative equilibrium” in 
which the manager always discloses 𝐷𝐻 or 𝐷𝐿, regardless of his private signal, and 
engages in upward earnings management when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿. 
2. There may be an equilibrium, denoted as “sanitization with management 
equilibrium” in which the manager discloses 𝐷𝐻 when he observes 𝜎 = 1 and 
discloses 𝐷𝐿 otherwise. The manager always engages in upward earnings 
management when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿. This equilibrium is possible if (𝑘 + 1)
𝛿𝑝𝐿
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿
<
(1−𝛿)𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)+𝑝𝐻𝑞
, or equivalently, 𝛿 is smaller than some threshold 𝛿𝑠𝑚
∗ ∈ (0,1).   
3. There may be an equilibrium, denoted as “separation with management 
equilibrium” in which the manager discloses 𝐷𝐻 when he observes 𝜎 = 1 or 𝑠 = ℎ, 
and discloses 𝐷𝐿 otherwise. The manager always engages in upward earnings 
management when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿. This equilibrium is possible if 
 
(1−𝛿)(1−𝑝𝐻)(1−𝑞)
𝛿(1−𝑝𝐻)(1−𝑞)+𝑝𝐻𝑞
𝜃
𝑞(1−𝜃)+𝜃
 <
𝑘𝛿𝑝𝐿𝑝𝐻(2𝑞−1+2𝜃(1−𝑞))+𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)(−𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)𝜃+𝑝𝐻(𝑞(2−𝜃)−(1−𝜃)))
(𝑝𝐻(𝑞+𝜃)−𝑝𝐻𝑞𝜃+𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)(1−𝜃))((1−𝑞)(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿(𝑞+𝜃−𝑞𝜃))
  
                   <
(1−𝛿)(1−𝑝𝐻)𝑞
𝛿(1−𝑝𝐻)𝑞+𝑝𝐻(1−𝑞)
𝜃
𝑞(1−𝜃)+𝜃
. 
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 i) When  𝑝𝐻 >
𝜃(1−𝑞)
𝜃+(1−𝜃)(2𝑞−1)
, there always exists a 𝛿∗ ∈ (0,1)  s.t. for 𝛿 = 𝛿∗, such 
an equilibrium exists;  
ii) When 𝑝𝐻 ≥
1
2
 and 𝑘 is sufficiently large, there exist 𝛿 and 𝛿̅ where 0 < 𝛿 < 𝛿̅ < 1 
 such that this equilibrium exists if and only if 𝛿 ∈ (𝛿, 𝛿); and, 
iii) When 𝑝𝐻 is sufficiently small, such an equilibrium does not exist.  
4. There may be an equilibrium, denoted as “reverse sanitization with management 
equilibrium” in which the manager discloses 𝐷𝐿 when he observes 𝜎 = 0 and 
discloses 𝐷𝐻 otherwise. The manager always engages in upward earnings 
management when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿. This equilibrium is possible if 
 
𝑝𝐻(1−𝑞)
𝑝𝐻(1−𝑞)+𝑞(1−𝑝𝐻)
+
𝑞(1−𝑝𝐻)
𝑝𝐻(1−𝑞)+𝑞(1−𝑝𝐻)
𝛿 >
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
𝑝𝐻
+
1
𝑘+1
> 𝛿.  
             Among the four possible equilibria, the first, second, and fourth can be eliminated with 
suitable equilibrium selection criteria.  
 Proposition 2 states that there will be pervasive earnings management in all pure 
strategy equilibria. When reporting 𝑅𝐿, the investor knows that true earnings must be 𝑥𝐿 and the 
manager’s ability is at most 𝑎2. When reporting 𝑅𝐻, the investor knows that true earnings can 
be 𝑥𝐻 and the manager’s ability can be 𝑎3. The proof of Proposition 2 shows that 𝐸[?̃? +
𝜆𝑎|𝐷, 𝑅𝐻] ≥ 𝐸[?̃? + 𝜆𝑎|𝐷, 𝑅𝐿], regardless of 𝐷. Since earnings management has no upfront 
cost, the manager will always want to manage earnings up when true earnings number is 𝑥𝐿.  
Proposition 2 also shows that the uninformative equilibrium and the sanitization 
equilibrium in the absence of discretion over mandatory disclosure are still preserved when 
discretion is allowed, although the sanitization equilibrium is only possible for sufficiently 
small 𝛿 (i.e., low levels of discretion). The uninformative equilibrium always exists because it 
is always possible for the investor to ignore the manager’s voluntary disclosure. The 
sustainability of the sanitization equilibrium, on the other hand, relies on the endogenous 
penalty arising from lower perceived managerial ability when 𝐷𝐻 is followed by 𝑅𝐿. When 𝛿 
becomes larger (i.e., more discretion is granted), such an event becomes less likely as the 
manager can manage earnings up with a higher probability of success. The expected penalty 
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thus becomes smaller, making the sanitization equilibrium eventually not sustainable. To see 
this more clearly, the condition in Proposition 2 that ensures the existence of the sanitization 
with management equilibrium comes from (1 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1 − 𝛿))(𝑈𝐻𝐻 − 𝑈𝐿𝐻) < (1 −
𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1 − 𝛿)(𝑈𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝐻𝐿), where 𝑝𝐻𝑖 denotes the probability of true earnings being 𝑥𝐻 when 
manager observes 𝑠 = 𝑖 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙}, and 𝑈𝑡𝑣 ≡ 𝐸[?̃? + 𝜆𝑎|𝐷𝑡 , 𝑅𝑣] is the manager’s payoff at the 
voluntary disclosure 𝐷𝑡 and mandatory disclosure 𝑅𝑣, for 𝑡, 𝑣 = 𝐻, 𝐿. The right hand side term 
thus represents the loss for the manager who observes 𝑠 = ℎ and discloses 𝐷𝐻 (relative to 𝐷𝐿)  
when mandatory disclosure turns out to be 𝑅𝐿, which occurs with probability (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1 −
𝛿), that is, when true earnings is 𝑥𝐿 and earnings management is  unsuccessful. The left-side 
term represents the gain for the manager who observes 𝑠 = ℎ and discloses 𝐷𝐻 (relative to 𝐷𝐿) 
when mandatory disclosure turns out to be 𝑅𝐻, which occurs with probability 1 − (1 −
𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1 − 𝛿). When the gain is smaller than the loss, the manager who observes 𝑠 = ℎ has no 
incentive to disclose 𝐷𝐻. This implies that the manager who observes 𝑠 = 𝑙 or 𝜎 = 0 has no 
incentive to disclose 𝐷𝐻 either since his gain from disclosing 𝐷𝐻 is even more dominated by his 
loss from disclosing 𝐷𝐻. The left hand side can be shown to be increasing in 𝛿 whereas the right 
hand side is decreasing in 𝛿. Therefore this equilibrium is sustainable only when 𝛿 is 
sufficiently small.  
The opportunity to manage earnings also introduces two more pure strategy equilibria 
that are otherwise not available: the “reverse sanitization with management equilibrium” and 
the “separation with management equilibrium.”  The term “reverse sanitization” refers to 
disclosing the upper bound of the manager’s information set, as opposed to the lower bound in 
the sanitization equilibrium. Recall that in the sanitization equilibrium, the manager discloses 
𝐷𝐻 only when he is sure that the true earnings number is 𝑥𝐻. In the reverse sanitization 
equilibrium, the manager discloses 𝐷𝐿 only when he is sure that the true earnings number is 𝑥𝐿. 
Thus disclosing 𝐷𝐻 can result in a penalty when it is followed by 𝑅𝐿. However, allowing 
discretion increases the attractiveness of disclosing 𝐷𝐻 in two ways. First, the manager can 
reduce the incidence of the penalty through successful upward earnings management when 
𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿. Second, for the manager who observes 𝜎 = 0 and follows the reverse sanitization 
strategy, 𝐸[?̃? + 𝜆𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅] = 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆𝑎2 for ∀ 𝑅. This is also the payoff of a manager who 
observes 𝑠 (but not 𝜎) and deviates from the reverse sanitization strategy by switching from 𝐷𝐻 
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to 𝐷𝐿. The expected cost and benefit of this deviation is twofold: the expected true earnings is 
reduced from a weighted average of 𝑥𝐿 and 𝑥𝐻 to 𝑥𝐿 (a net cost), and the perceived ability is 
changed from a weighted average of 𝑎1 and 𝑎3 to 𝑎2 (a net cost or benefit). The conditions 
specified in Proposition 2 ensure that the expected benefit exceeds the expected cost, thus 
rendering disclosing 𝐷𝐻 the optimal strategy when 𝜎 = 0 is not observed.
11 To see this more 
clearly, note that the conditions in Proposition 2 come from (1 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻𝑙)(1 − 𝛿))(𝑈𝐻𝐻 −
𝑈𝐿𝐻) > (1 − 𝑝𝐻𝑙)(1 − 𝛿)(𝑈𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝐻𝐿) and 𝛿(𝑈𝐻𝐻 − 𝑈𝐿𝐻) < (1 − 𝛿)(𝑈𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝐻𝐿). Applying 
similar reasoning as that in the discussion of sanitization with management equilibrium, the first 
inequality guarantees that the expected benefit of disclosing 𝐷𝐻 exceeds the expected cost when 
the manager observes 𝑠 = 𝑙. This ensures the optimality of disclosing 𝐷𝐻 for the manager who 
observes 𝑠 = ℎ or 𝜎 = 1 since his expected benefit from disclosing 𝐷𝐻 is even more dominant 
relative to his expected cost. The second inequality says that the expected benefit of disclosing 
𝐷𝐻 is smaller than the cost when the manager observes 𝜎 = 0. Thus the “reverse sanitization 
with management equilibrium” is sustained.  
In the “separation with management equilibrium,” the manager again can incur a penalty 
by disclosing 𝐷𝐻 when he is not sure that the true earnings number is 𝑥𝐻. Similarly, allowing 
discretion in mandatory disclosure reduces the likelihood of such a penalty and increases the 
attractiveness of disclosing 𝐷𝐻. When 𝛿 is neither too large nor too small, the manager who 
observes 𝑠 = ℎ will find the reduction in the expected penalty sufficiently large to prefer 
disclosing 𝐷𝐻; however, for the manager who observes 𝑠 = 𝑙 or 𝜎 = 0, this reduction is too 
small so he still prefers to disclose 𝐷𝐿. This intuition is reflected in the two conditions in 
Proposition 2, which can be rewritten as (1 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻𝑙)(1 − 𝛿))(𝑈𝐻𝐻 − 𝑈𝐿𝐻) < (1 −
𝑝𝐻𝑙)(1 − 𝛿)(𝑈𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝐻𝐿) and (1 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1 − 𝛿))(𝑈𝐻𝐻 − 𝑈𝐿𝐻) > (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1 −
𝛿)(𝑈𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝐻𝐿). The first inequality ensures that the manager who observes 𝑠 = 𝑙 finds it too 
costly to disclose 𝐷𝐻, whereas the second inequality ensures that the manager who observes 
𝑠 = ℎ finds it preferable to disclose 𝐷𝐻. This generates a separation in voluntary disclosure in 
                                                          
11 Note that it may seem plausible that under certain parameters, the equilibrium condition of the reverse 
sanitization with management equilibrium can be supported when no discretion is allowed (i.e., 𝛿 = 0). However, 
this is due to a discontinuity nature in investor’s beliefs. When 𝛿 = 0, 𝑅𝐻 (𝑅𝐿) implies that true earnings must be 
𝑥𝐻 (𝑥𝐿), so 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷, 𝑅𝐻] = 𝑎3 for 𝐷 = 𝐷𝐻 , 𝐷𝐿; 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑎2; and 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑎1. While when 𝛿 > 0, under 
the reverse sanitization strategy, 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐻] is a weighted average of 𝑎1 and 𝑎3. 
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the sense that the manager discloses 𝐷𝐻 (𝐷𝐿) when he has relatively good (bad) private 
information. Note that this equilibrium requires 𝑝𝐻 to be not too small. The reason is that, when 
seeing 𝐷𝐻 and 𝑅𝐻, the investor will assign some probability to the inference that this disclosure 
comes from the manager observing  𝑠 = ℎ. When 𝑝𝐻 is sufficiently low, the ex ante probability 
of true earnings being 𝑥𝐻 is very low. Thus the investor conjectures that any signal other than 
𝜎 = 1 is highly likely generated from 𝑥𝐿. This implies that the inferred probability that the 
manager is of the lowest ability given 𝐷𝐻 and 𝑅𝐻 or 𝑝(𝑎1|𝐷𝐻, 𝑅𝐻) is so high that 
𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐻] < 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻] and 𝐸[?̃? + 𝜆𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐻] < 𝐸[?̃? + 𝜆𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻], making the separation 
strategy not optimal.  
Proposition 2 also shows that all equilibria other than the separation with management 
equilibrium can be eliminated by suitable equilibrium selection criterion. The intuition for 
eliminating the uninformative equilibrium and the sanitization with management equilibrium is 
the same as when no reporting discretion is allowed. The reverse sanitization with management 
equilibrium can be eliminated because it relies on the manager who observes 𝜎 = 0 being 
indifferent between managing the reported earnings up and reporting truthfully. Hence, this 
equilibrium is vulnerable to a small perturbation of the payoffs of the persuasion game. We thus 
focus on the separation with management equilibrium for our subsequent analysis of the price 
informativeness of voluntary disclosures.  
Proposition 2 reiterates the spirit of Shin (1994) in a subtle way. In Shin (1994), 
investors are rationally skeptical. So in valuing the firm, they weigh more (less) heavily the low 
(high) values implied by a voluntary disclosure. Such skepticism comes from the manager’s 
incentive to strategically suppress unfavorable information about the states; that is, the manager 
suppresses information indicating that the earnings number is smaller than the biggest number 
inferred from his private information and only discloses that the earnings number is no smaller 
than the smallest number his information can possibly justify (i.e., the sanitization strategy).12 
Therefore the degree of skepticism is an increasing function of the probability that the manager 
                                                          
12 For example, given that the true earnings takes a value of {1, 2, 3, 4}, if the manager’s private information 
indicates that the earnings will actually be either 2 or 3, he will disclose that the earnings is (at least) 2 but suppress 
the information that the earnings is at most 3. Investors, observing a forecast of (at least) 2, can only infer that the 
earnings falls into one of the following: {2}, {2, 3}, {2, 3, 4}, {3}, {3, 4}, and, {4}. However, a forecast of (at 
least) 4 can only mean that the earnings number is in fact {4}. 
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is informed, captured by the probability that each signal can be observed or θ. In our setting, 
however, investors’ skepticism comes from two sources: the manager’s incentive to suppress 
bad news in his voluntary disclosure and the effect of the manager’s potential upward earnings 
management to match his mandatory disclosure to his prior voluntary disclosure. When the 
success probability 𝛿 is low (i.e., a low level of discretion), the first source is the impetus, and 
our result mimics that of Shin. As 𝛿 increases, the second source gets stronger, and the 
sanitization strategy starts to fail to hold in equilibrium, resulting in a less obvious effect of θ on 
the degree of skepticism. On the other hand, the increase in 𝛿 makes the investor less skeptical 
about the low voluntary disclosures, and more about the higher ones, a result that is opposite to 
Shin (1994), where the investor is more skeptical when the voluntary disclosure is low and, at 
the extreme, takes literally the highest voluntary disclosure. In our case, the investor takes 
literally the lowest voluntary disclosure but is extremely skeptical about the highest voluntary 
disclosure in the reverse sanitization with management equilibrium.  
Since the separation with management equilibrium identified in Proposition 2 
incorporates more of the manager’s private information than the sanitization equilibrium 
identified in Proposition 1, one would expect the informativeness of the voluntary disclosures in 
the former equilibrium to dominate that in the latter equilibrium when manager’s private 
information is sufficiently precise. The next proposition shows that this intuition indeed holds. 
Note that we measure informativeness as the mean squared error of the price response to the 
fundamentals (i.e., the realized true earnings, x ). The higher the mean squared error, the lower 
the informativeness of the voluntary disclosure (Gao 2008; Chen et al. 2012).   
Proposition 3  
When 𝑝𝐻 ≥
1+𝜃
4𝜃
, the voluntary disclosure is always more informative when some degree of 
discretion over the mandatory disclosure is allowed. When 𝑝𝐻 <
1+𝜃
4𝜃
, there exists a 𝑞∗ ∈ (
1
2
, 1) 
so that for 𝑞 > 𝑞∗, the price informativeness of the voluntary disclosure is higher when some 
degree of discretion is allowed.  
Proposition 3 thus implies that some degree of discretion is desirable in the sense of 
improving the informativeness of the voluntary disclosure. In other words, granting the 
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manager some discretion over what he can report in his mandatory disclosure would enable him 
to convey to the market more of his private information, that is, his knowledge of the 
distribution of the true earnings. For example, when 𝑞 is large, the manager who observes 𝑠 =
ℎ infers a sufficiently optimistic distribution of the earnings (i.e., skewed to the larger value) 
from his private signal. He can then make a higher earnings forecast, and in the case that the 
low earnings is realized (an low likelihood event), he will be able to potentially  cover himself 
by using the granted discretion to manage earnings upward so that the reported earnings will 
not fall short of the forecast if earnings management is successful. Investors anticipate the 
manager’s behavior and rationally interpret the manager’s disclosure as conveying more than 
just the lower bound of his private information and price the firm accordingly, resulting in more 
information impounded in stock prices. 
Note that Proposition 3 requires 𝑞 to be sufficiently high (i.e., private signal to be 
sufficiently informative) when 𝑝𝐻 is low. The intuition is as follows. When 𝑝𝐻 is low, the 
project is ex ante very likely to generate low earnings. Thus precise information regarding when 
the project would generate high earnings becomes very valuable. Since sanitization equilibrium 
exhibits perfectly informative good news disclosure, the noisy private information the manager 
incorporates into the voluntary disclosure has to be sufficiently precise for the separation 
disclosure to be more informative. When 𝑝𝐻 is high, however, precise information regarding 
when the project would generate low earnings becomes highly valuable, implying sanitization 
equilibrium is not very informative. Therefore incorporating any informative private 
information into the voluntary disclosure increases its informativeness.  
 Recall from Proposition 2 that the separation with management equilibrium requires the 
discretion allowed in mandatory disclosure, 𝛿, to be in the intermediate range, i.e., 𝛿 cannot be 
too large. This is intuitive, as giving the manager too much discretion would prompt him to 
ignore his private information and always disclose the highest value. He will then attempt to 
manage earnings up to the forecasted level whenever the realized earnings fall short. Consistent 
with this disclosure strategy, investors will choose to ignore the manager’s disclosure 
completely, and thus no information other than the prior is priced. In this case, imposing some 
constraints on earnings management will make the manager with (highly) pessimistic 
information refrain from issuing unduly optimistic voluntary disclosure, again improving the 
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information content of the voluntary disclosure. Hence, from the perspective of the 
informativeness of the voluntary disclosure, in its interaction with the mandatory disclosure, 
there exists a desirable level of discretion to be granted to the manager, a topic that has not been 
studied extensively.13 
Previously, we mentioned that giving the manager the option to manage reported 
earnings might lead him to exercise this option for his own benefit. However, it is exactly this 
self-interested earnings management that sometimes enables the manager to incorporate more 
private information in his voluntary disclosure. Thus (opportunistic) earnings management can 
have a hidden benefit of improving the informativeness of the more timely voluntary disclosure, 
a message that we try to convey. Beyer et al. (2010) document that approximately 66% of the 
accounting-based information that investors use is provided by firms’ voluntary disclosures, 
while mandatory disclosures account for less than 12%. Therefore voluntary disclosure has 
become a major (and dominant) source of financial information that the capital market relies 
upon, and the informativeness of voluntary disclosure is thus an important efficiency metric. 
We believe the message that earnings management may help to improve the informativeness of 
voluntary disclosure has significant policy implications. To the best of our knowledge, this 
paper is one of the few analytical papers to provide justification for allowing managers some 
discretion in financial reporting in the context of the interaction between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures with mandatory disclosure being used to discipline the more timely 
voluntary disclosure. 
4. Discussions and Empirical Implications 
We now discuss the effect of relaxing some of the modelling assumptions on our results.  
First, for analytical tractability, we assume binary states of true underlying earnings, but 
we expect our results to hold qualitatively for a more general 𝑁-state model as in Shin (1994). 
The reason is that the intuition underlying the results of the binary states setting does not seem 
to alter in any significant way. So long as the market penalizes the manager in the form of 
                                                          
13 Dye and Sridhar (2008) investigate the optimal level of discretion in a setting where accounting standards 
generate network externalities. They focus on mandatory financial statements. We do not address the issue of 
optimal level of disclosure as we only focus on the effect of discretion on the informativeness of voluntary 
disclosure. 
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lower perceived managerial abilities for any mismatches between voluntary disclosure and the 
subsequent mandatory disclosure, in the absence of accounting discretion, the manager finds the 
sanitization strategy to be optimal to avoid such a penalty. As a result, he incorporates no 
private information into his voluntary disclosure. But with some degree of discretion over the 
mandatory disclosure and sufficiently precise private information, the manager with sufficiently 
optimistic private information finds that the likelihood of the subsequent (managed) mandatory 
disclosure falling short of a higher voluntary disclosure than the one that is warranted by the 
sanitization strategy is sufficiently low. Thus the benefit from forecasting a higher number (in 
terms of both a higher expected earnings number and a higher perceived ability) outweighs the 
expected penalty. Consequently, more private information is incorporated into the voluntary 
disclosure, making it more price informative.  
Secondly, we assume that, when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻, the manager’s ability has no effect on whether 
𝜎 or 𝑠 will be observed. Again this assumption is for analytical tractability. We can modify the 
model to include four managerial ability levels with the manager observing 𝜎 = 1 to have 
ability 𝑎4, which is larger than 𝑎3, now defined as the ability of the manager with 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻 
observing 𝑠 but not 𝜎. This modification increases the benefit of the manager who does not 
observe 𝜎 and discloses 𝐷𝐻, as he may now be perceived as a manager with ability 𝑎4. So long 
as the potential benefit, 𝑎4 − 𝑎3 is sufficiently smaller than 𝑎2 − 𝑎1, that is, the cost associated 
with disclosing 𝐷𝐻 followed by 𝑅𝐿, our main results remain unchanged. The intuition is that, 
when the manager does not observe 𝜎, he is not entirely sure whether the true earnings will be 
low or high. The expected damage of his perceived ability from disclosing 𝐷𝐻 followed by 𝑅𝐿 
when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿 is too high compared to the expected damage from disclosing 𝐷𝐿 followed by 𝑅𝐻 
when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻. Thus, in the absence of discretion, the sanitization strategy is optimal. However, 
when some degree of discretion is allowed, separation with management strategy becomes 
optimal because the manager can manage earnings upward to lower such expected damage even 
when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿.  
The results of this paper offer insights into some empirical findings and yield additional 
empirical implications that could be tested.  
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First, in an attempt to investigate whether accounting discretion is explained by 
managerial opportunism or efficient contracting, Bowen et al. (2008) provide empirical 
evidence that shareholders benefit from earnings management resulting from the latitude 
allowed by GAAP. They conjecture that this might be due to managers incorporating private 
information into accounting reports to signal competence or future performance. Our model 
suggests that the discretion imbedded in GAAP enables managers to convey more private 
information about firm performance and managerial ability through more timely voluntary 
disclosure. 
Second, we show that some degree of earnings management can result in a more 
informative voluntary disclosure, despite a decreased (or “more skeptical”) price response to 
the (high) voluntary disclosure. We are not aware of any empirical papers that directly test this 
hypothesis.14 Rogers and Stocken (2005) document that managers’ willingness to bias their 
forecasts decreases with the market’s ability to detect misrepresentation and that investors’ 
response to management forecasts is consistent with their ability to identify predictable forecast 
biases in the management forecasts. This result comports with our story in the sense that 
investors are more skeptical toward management forecasts that are perceived to be inflated. 
Most of the literature that explores the relationship between voluntary and mandatory 
disclosures focuses on the relationships between certain attributes of voluntary earnings 
forecasts and reported earnings. Kasznik (1999) hypothesizes and finds that managers make 
income-increasing accounting decisions when earnings would otherwise be below management 
forecasts on the premise that earnings forecast errors impose costs on managers (such as 
investors’ perception of their (in)ability to anticipate changes in the economic environment), 
but he finds no evidence that underestimated earnings are associated with income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals. We confirm the findings in Kasznik (1999) that managers use earnings 
management to avoid disagreement between their voluntary and mandatory disclosures. 
However, our results go beyond showing a relationship between voluntary and mandatory 
disclosures. We further demonstrate that, under certain conditions, there exists a positive 
                                                          
14 One possible exception is Kim (2012). He finds that managers with more accounting flexibility choose to issue 
more specific earnings forecasts before their firms’ seasoned equity offerings. However, he also finds that forecasts 
are more optimistic, which may or may not increase price informativeness, and his setting is restricted to firms that 
issue seasoned equities.  
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relationship between the degree of discretion allowed in managing reported earnings and the 
price informativeness of earnings forecasts.  
Francis et al. (2008) find that firms with high-quality earnings have more expansive 
voluntary disclosure, while Hui, Matsunaga, and Morse (2009) document that more 
conservative accounting leads to fewer management forecasts. Our model implies that one 
possible explanation of these seemingly contradictory results is that the empirical proxies for 
the underlying constructs (e.g., conservatism and earnings quality) could have differential 
implications for managers’ reporting discretion. Specifically, to the extent that more 
conservatism implies less discretion, our model implies that the sanitization equilibrium will be 
more likely to occur under more conservative accounting. This is consistent with the results of 
Hui et al. (2009), as the sanitization equilibrium is associated with a higher likelihood of 
disclosing 𝐷𝐿 or, equivalently, remaining silent in our model.  
Third, Proposition 3 provides conditions where some degree of discretion will result in 
unambiguously more informative voluntary disclosures. Specifically, when 𝑝𝐻 is sufficiently 
high, any voluntary disclosure that incorporates some of the manager’s private information will 
be more informative. Thus the first prediction that more discretion increases the 
informativeness of voluntary disclosure will be stronger for firms with more profitable projects. 
In addition, Proposition 3 also predicts that when 𝑞 is sufficiently large, that is, the noisy 
private information is more precise, more discretion will always increase the informativeness of 
voluntary disclosure, regardless of the value of 𝑝𝐻. Since in our model 𝑞 represents the 
information asymmetry between managers and outside shareholders, we would also expect the 
first prediction to be stronger for firms with more information asymmetry between managers 
and outside shareholders.  
5. Conclusions 
Using a model of an exchange economy motivated by Shin (1994), we investigate the 
interaction between the voluntary disclosure and the subsequent mandatory disclosure of value-
relevant information. We assume that the manager receives a private signal that helps him to 
assess the likelihood that each value will occur and to get a sense of his managerial ability. The 
manager has the option of issuing a voluntary disclosure of the firm’s earnings after observing 
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the signal. Then he has to make a mandatory disclosure of the earnings after he observes the 
realization of the true earnings. The manager has the flexibility to manage the mandatory 
disclosure with some success probability to make it line up with his voluntary disclosure to 
avoid the penalty arising from an earnings disappointment. We show that, in equilibrium, 
allowing the manager some discretion over the mandatory financial report enables him to 
incorporate private information into his more timely voluntary disclosure and thus enhances the 
price informativeness of the voluntary disclosure. However, too much discretion is undesirable 
because it induces the manager to always voluntarily disclose high earnings numbers and ignore 
his private information. Thus there is a hidden benefit to granting the manager some degree of 
discretion over his mandatory disclosure, and there is a maximal amount of such discretion that 
should be tolerated, consistent with the discretion imbedded in GAAP. 
Our finding that voluntary and mandatory disclosures complement each other in the 
sense that the primarily backward-looking and less timely mandatory disclosure allows the 
manager to disclose voluntarily (and somewhat credibly) forward-looking and timely private 
information echoes the long-standing view in the accounting literature that the voluntary 
disclosure serves as a source of new information, while the mandatory disclosure plays an 
important confirmatory (or disciplinary) role that makes the voluntary disclosure credible and 
informative (e.g., Sansing 1992; Stocken 2000; Dutta and Gigler 2002). However, we derive 
this intuition in a completely different setting, and the result that granting some but not too 
much discretion over the mandatory disclosure has the potential of enabling managers to 
incorporate more of their private information in the “unrestricted” voluntary disclosure is new. 
Our results also have policy implications. From a regulator’s perspective, tolerating 
some degree of earnings management by allowing some discretion in the accounting standards 
may be desirable if the price informativeness of voluntary disclosures is an important goal. 
Given that voluntary disclosure is a major source of firms’ information and accounts for about 
85% of the firm-provided accounting-based information that investors use (Beyer et. al. 2010), 
enhancing the informativeness of voluntary disclosures seems to be essential for efficiently 
allocating the scarce resources.   
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Appendix A: A summary of notations used in the paper 
Notation Meaning of the notation 
𝑥𝑖, 𝑖 = 𝐻, 𝐿 True Earnings which depends on the 
underlying state 𝑖. We sometimes also use 𝑥 
to refer to true earnings in general.  
𝑝𝑖, 𝑖 = 𝐻, 𝐿 Prior probability of the firm being in state 𝑖. 
𝜎(𝑖), 𝑖 = 𝐻, 𝐿 A perfectly informative signal about the true 
earnings defined by equation (1). 
𝜃 Probability of observing 𝜎(𝑖). 
𝑠 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙} A noisy signal about the true earnings when 
𝜎(𝑖) cannot be observed. 
𝑞 The informativeness of 𝑠 about true earnings, 
as defined in equation (2).  
𝑝𝑖𝑗, 𝑖 = 𝐻, 𝐿; 𝑗 = ℎ, 𝑙 𝑝(𝑥 = 𝑥𝑖|𝑠 = 𝑗), i.e., manager’s perceived 
probability of 𝑥 = 𝑥𝑖 conditional on 
observing 𝑠 = 𝑗.  
𝑎𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1,2,3 Manager’s ability, which determines both the 
probability of generating high true earnings 
and the probability of observing 𝜎(𝑖). 
Ω Manager’s information set before voluntary 
disclosure. 
𝐷𝑖 , 𝑖 = 𝐻, 𝐿 Voluntary disclosure of true earnings number 
being at least 𝑥𝑖. We sometimes also use 𝐷 to 
refer to voluntary disclosure in general. 
𝑅(𝐷, 𝑥) Manager’s mandatory disclosure strategy, 
which is a function of his voluntary 
disclosure strategy 𝐷 and true earnings 
number 𝑥. Manager’s mandatory disclosure 
strategy and his earnings management 
strategy jointly determine the distribution of 
the realized mandatory disclosure.  
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?̂?(𝐷, 𝑥) Investors’ conjecture about manager’s 
mandatory disclosure strategy.  
𝑚(𝐷, 𝑅, 𝑥) ∈ {0,1} Manager’s earnings management decision as 
a function of his voluntary disclosure 
strategy, mandatory disclosure strategy and 
true earnings.  𝑚(𝐷, 𝑅, 𝑥) = 0(1) represents 
no earnings management (earnings 
management). 
?̂?(𝐷, 𝑅, 𝑥) ∈ {0,1} Investors’ conjecture about manager’s 
earnings management decision.  
𝛿 Probability of successful upward earnings 
management.  
𝑅𝑖, 𝑖 = 𝐻, 𝐿 Realization of mandatory disclosure 𝑥𝑖. We 
sometimes also use 𝑅 to refer to realization 
of mandatory disclosure in general. 
𝑃(𝐷, 𝑅; 𝑚) Price response when the voluntary disclosure 
is 𝐷, the realization of mandatory disclosure 
is 𝑅 and the manager’s manipulation strategy 
is 𝑚.  
?̂?(𝐷, 𝑅; 𝑚) Manager’s conjecture about investor’s price 
response.  
𝜆 Relative weight that manager places on the 
perceived ability in his payoff function. 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 ≡ 𝑃(𝐷𝑖, 𝑅𝑗; 𝑚) + 𝜆𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑗], 𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝐻, 𝐿 Manager’s payoff at voluntary disclosure 𝐷𝑖 
and the realization of mandatory disclosure 
𝑅𝑗.  
  
Furthermore, in general we use 𝑝 to denote probability, 𝑃 to denote price, and 𝐸 to denote 
expectation.  
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Appendix B: Technical Details Including Proofs 
We focus on equilibria in which 𝑃(𝐷𝐻) ≥ 𝑃(𝐷𝐿), i.e., 𝐷𝐻 conveys news that is perceived at 
least as good as that of 𝐷𝐿.  
Lemma 1. 𝑃(𝐷𝐻) ≥ 𝑃(𝐷𝐿) implies that in equilibrium it cannot be the case for a manager 
observing 𝜎 = 1 (𝜎 = 0 ) to strictly prefer disclosing 𝐷𝐿 (𝐷𝐻).  
Proof of Lemma 1:  
Suppose this is true. 𝑃(𝐷𝐻) and 𝑃(𝐷𝐿) then depends on the strategy of the manager who 
observes 𝑠. There are four possible cases.  
Case 1: The manager who observes 𝑠 always discloses 𝐷𝐻 regardless of what 𝑠 is. This however 
cannot be sustained in equilibrium as  𝑃(𝐷𝐿) =𝑥𝐻> 𝑃(𝐷𝐻). 
Case 2: The manager who observes 𝑠 always discloses 𝐷𝐿 regardless of what 𝑠 is. This however 
cannot be sustained in equilibrium as  𝑃(𝐷𝐻) =𝑥𝐿< 𝑃(𝐷𝐿). 
Case 3: The manager who observes 𝑠 = ℎ and 𝑠 = 𝑙 discloses 𝐷𝐿 and 𝐷𝐻 respectively. This 
results in:  
𝑝(𝑥𝐻|𝐷𝐿) =
𝑝(𝐷𝐿|𝑥𝐻)𝑝𝐻
𝑝(𝐷𝐿|𝑥𝐻)𝑝𝐻+𝑝(𝐷𝐿|𝑥𝐿)𝑝𝐿
=
(1−(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞))𝑝𝐻
(1−(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞))𝑝𝐻+(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐿
 =
1
1+
(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)
1−(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)
 
𝑝𝐿
𝑝𝐻
, and, 
𝑝(𝑥𝐻|𝐷𝐻) =
𝑝(𝐷𝐻|𝑥𝐻)𝑝𝐻
𝑝(𝐷𝐻|𝑥𝐻)𝑝𝐻+𝑝(𝐷𝐻|𝑥𝐿)𝑝𝐿
=
(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐻
(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐻+(1−(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞))𝑝𝐿
= 
1
1+
1−(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)
(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)
 
𝑝𝐿
𝑝𝐻
.     
Since 
(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)
1−(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)
<
1−(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)
(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)
, 𝑝(𝑥𝐻|𝐷𝐿) > 𝑝(𝑥𝐻|𝐷𝐻), thus 𝑃(𝐷𝐿) > 𝑃(𝐷𝐻), which 
contradicts 𝑃(𝐷𝐻) ≥ 𝑃(𝐷𝐿). 
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Case 4: The manager who observes 𝑠 = ℎ and 𝑙 discloses 𝐷𝐻 and 𝐷𝐿 respectively. Similarly:  
𝑝(𝑥𝐻|𝐷𝐿) =
1
1+
(1−𝜃)𝑞
(1−(1−𝜃)𝑞)
 
𝑝𝐿
𝑝𝐻
,  and, 𝑝(𝑥𝐻|𝐷𝐻) =
1
1+
1−(1−𝜃)𝑞
(1−𝜃)𝑞
 
𝑝𝐿
𝑝𝐻
.                                        
(i) When 
(1−𝜃)𝑞
(1−(1−𝜃)𝑞)
<
1−(1−𝜃)𝑞
(1−𝜃)𝑞
, 𝑝(𝑥𝐻|𝐷𝐿) > 𝑝(𝑥𝐻|𝐷𝐻), thus 𝑃(𝐷𝐿) > 𝑃(𝐷𝐻), which 
again contradicts 𝑃(𝐷𝐻) ≥ 𝑃(𝐷𝐿).   
(ii) When 
(1−𝜃)𝑞
(1−(1−𝜃)𝑞)
≥
1−(1−𝜃)𝑞
(1−𝜃)𝑞
, or, equivalently, (1 − 𝜃)𝑞 ≥
1
2
, 𝑃(𝐷𝐻) ≥ 𝑃(𝐷𝐿). 
However this strategy cannot be sustained in equilibrium because the manager who 
observes 𝜎 = 1 will have incentive to switch from 𝐷𝐿 to 𝐷𝐻. The reason is as 
follows. First, switching gives a higher price response. Second, switching does not 
decrease the manager’s perceived ability because a manager who observes 𝜎 = 1 
will always have 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻. When no reporting discretion is allowed, 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻] =
𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐻] = 𝑎3. When reporting discretion is allowed, as will be shown below, 
every manager type with  𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿 will manage earnings upward. Then, following the 
conjectured strategy, {𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻} implies that manager can be of either 𝑎3 (i.e., 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻) 
or 𝑎1 ( i.e., 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿, 𝑠 = 𝑙 is observed, and earnings management is successful). This 
gives: 
𝑝(𝑎3|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻) =
𝑝(𝐷𝐿 ,  𝑅𝐻|𝑎3)𝑝(𝑎3)
𝑝(𝐷𝐿 ,  𝑅𝐻|𝑎1)𝑝(𝑎1)+𝑝(𝐷𝐿 ,  𝑅𝐻|𝑎3)𝑝(𝑎3)
=
𝑝𝐻
𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)𝑞
, and,  
𝑝(𝑎1|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻) =
𝑝(𝐷𝐿 ,  𝑅𝐻|𝑎1)𝑝(𝑎1)
𝑝(𝐷𝐿 ,  𝑅𝐻|𝑎1)𝑝(𝑎1)+𝑝(𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻|𝑎3)𝑝(𝑎3)
=
𝑝𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)𝑞
𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)𝑞
.  
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Similarly, following the conjectured strategy, observing {𝐷𝐻, 𝑅𝐻} implies that the 
manager can be of 𝑎3 (i.e., 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻), 𝑎2 ( i.e., 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿 and 𝜎 = 0 is observed), or 𝑎1 
(i.e., 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿 and 𝑠 = ℎ is observed). This gives: 
𝑝(𝑎3|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐻) =
𝑝𝐻
𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−(1−𝜃)𝑞)
 , 𝑝(𝑎2|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐻) =
𝛿𝑝𝐿𝜃
𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−(1−𝜃)𝑞)
, and,  
𝑝(𝑎1|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐻)  =
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)
𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−(1−𝜃)𝑞)
 . 
Since (1 − 𝜃)𝑞 ≥
1
2
, (1 − 𝜃)𝑞 ≥ 1 − (1 − 𝜃)𝑞. This indicates 𝑝(𝑎3|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐻) ≥
𝑝(𝑎3|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻).  Thus 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐻] ≥ 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻]. This means that the manager who 
observes 𝜎 = 1 is better off by deviating to disclosing 𝐷𝐻. Q.E.D. 
Assuming that the manager who observes 𝜎 = 1 (𝜎 = 0) discloses 𝐷𝐻 (𝐷𝐿) when indifferent 
between 𝐷𝐻 and 𝐷𝐿 , Lemma 1 implies that only three cases are possible in equilibrium when 𝜎 
is observed: (1) The manager discloses 𝐷𝐿 regardless of 𝜎; (2) The manager discloses 𝐷𝐻 
regardless of 𝜎; and (3) The manager discloses 𝐷𝐻 if 𝜎 = 1 and 𝐷𝐿 if 𝜎 = 0. We will use this 
result in the subsequent analysis.  
Proof of Proposition 1: 
When no discretion is allowed, 𝐸[?̃?|𝐷, 𝑅] = 𝑅, ∀𝐷, 𝑅. Thus 𝐸[𝐸[?̃?|𝐷, 𝑅]|𝛺] = 𝐸[𝑅|𝛺]. 
Manager’s choice of 𝐷 has no effect on the price of the firm. Therefore, the manager chooses 𝐷 
to maximize investor’s perceived ability of him, 𝐸[𝐸[𝑎|𝐷, 𝑅]|𝛺].  
First we introduce some notations. Let 𝑝𝐻ℎ ≡ 𝑝(𝑥𝐻|ℎ) =
𝑝(ℎ|𝑥𝐻)𝑝𝐻
𝑝(ℎ|𝑥𝐻)𝑝𝐻+𝑝(ℎ|𝑥𝐿)𝑝𝐿
=
𝑞𝑝𝐻
𝑞𝑝𝐻+(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐿
 be 
the probability of 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻 given 𝑠 = ℎ is observed, and 𝑝𝐻𝑙 ≡ 𝑝(𝑥𝐻|𝑙) =
𝑝(𝑙|𝑥𝐻)𝑝𝐻
𝑝(𝑙|𝑥𝐻)𝑝𝐻+𝑝(𝑙|𝑥𝐿)𝑝𝐿
=
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(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐻
(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐻+𝑞𝑝𝐿
 be the probability of 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻 given 𝑠 = 𝑙 is observed. Define the manager’s type by 
his private signal of the true earnings at the time of voluntary disclosure (e.g., manager of type 
𝑠 = ℎ means a manager who does not observe 𝜎, but observes 𝑠 = ℎ). Let’s rewrite 
𝐸[𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝑖, 𝑅]|𝑠 = 𝑗] as 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝑖 , 𝑠 = 𝑗] for 𝑖 = 𝐻, 𝐿 and 𝑗 = ℎ, 𝑙 when this does not generate 
confusion. 
There are then four manager types: 𝜎 = 1; 𝜎 = 0;  𝑠 = ℎ; and  𝑠 = 𝑙. 𝑃(𝐷𝐻) ≥ 𝑃(𝐷𝐿) implies 
that if manager of type 𝜎 = 0 discloses 𝐷𝐻, then manager of type  𝜎 = 1 also discloses  𝐷𝐻. 
However, if manager of type 𝜎 = 0 discloses 𝐷𝐿, then manager of type  𝜎 = 1 can disclose 
either 𝐷𝐻 or 𝐷𝐿.  
We characterize all pure strategy equilibria by examining all possible cases. Each case would 
contain a strategy profile of the manager that is allowed under 𝑃(𝐷𝐻) ≥ 𝑃(𝐷𝐿).  In each case 
we start with each manager type choosing the strategy specified and calculate his corresponding 
payoff. We then check whether there exists any type that has an incentive to deviate from the 
specified strategy – if this is true, then such a strategy cannot be an equilibrium strategy. All the 
pure strategies that survive this check are equilibrium pure strategies.   
Case 1: The manager discloses either 𝐷𝐿 or 𝐷𝐻, regardless of his type. 𝐷 thus has no 
information content, and 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷, 𝑅] = {
𝑎1
𝑝(𝑎1)
𝑝(𝑎1)+𝑝(𝑎2)
+ 𝑎2
𝑝(𝑎2)
𝑝(𝑎1)+𝑝(𝑎2)
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝐿
𝑎3                                                    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝐻
, ∀𝐷. This 
strategy is sustained in equilibrium since switching to an alternative strategy generates the same 
payoff. We denote this equilibrium “uninformative equilibrium.”  
Case 2: Manager of type 𝜎 = 1 or 𝜎 = 0 discloses 𝐷𝐿, and all other types disclose 𝐷𝐻.  
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In this case 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑎2, 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻] = 𝑎3,  𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑎1, and 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐻] = 𝑎3. 
Note, however, this strategy cannot be an equilibrium strategy as manager of type 𝑠 = ℎ will 
deviate from 𝐷𝐻 to 𝐷𝐿  because 
 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿, 𝑠 = ℎ] = (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿] + 𝑝𝐻ℎ𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻] = (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)𝑎2 + 𝑝𝐻ℎ𝑎3 
> (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)𝑎1 + 𝑝𝐻ℎ𝑎3 = (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻, 𝑅𝐿] + 𝑝𝐻ℎ𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐻] = 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑠 = ℎ].  
Case 3: Manager of type 𝜎 = 0 discloses 𝐷𝐿, and all other types disclose 𝐷𝐻.  
We denote this strategy as “reverse sanitization strategy” because this strategy is exactly the 
opposite of “sanitization strategy” of Shin (1994) in the sense that the manager will disclose 𝐷𝐿 
only when he is completely certain that 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿.  
In this case, 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑎2, 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑎1, and 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐻] = 𝑎3.   
Note that {𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻} is not expected to be observed under this strategy. Further, 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻] =
𝑎3 (i.e., when 𝑅𝐻is reported, the investor believes that 𝐷𝐿 is mistakenly made by a manager of 
𝑎3 since 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻 has to come from a manager of 𝑎3). However, this strategy cannot be an 
equilibrium strategy as manager of type  𝑠 = ℎ has an incentive to deviate from 𝐷𝐻  to 𝐷𝐿 
because 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿, 𝑠 = ℎ]  = (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)𝑎2 + 𝑝𝐻ℎ𝑎3 > (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)𝑎1 + 𝑝𝐻ℎ𝑎3𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻, 𝑠 = ℎ].  
Case 4: Manager of type 𝜎 = 0 or 𝑠 = 𝑙 discloses 𝐷𝐿, and all other types disclose 𝐷𝐻. 
In this case, 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑎1, 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿, 𝑅𝐻] = 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐻] = 𝑎3, and 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿, 𝑅𝐿] =
𝑎1𝑝(𝑎1|𝐷𝐿, 𝑅𝐿) + 𝑎2𝑝(𝑎2|𝐷𝐿, 𝑅𝐿).  
By Bayes’ Rule, 𝑝(𝑎1|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿) =
𝑝(𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿|𝑎1)𝑝(𝑎1)
𝑝(𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿|𝑎1)𝑝(𝑎1)+𝑝(𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿|𝑎2)𝑝(𝑎2)
=
𝑞𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
𝑞𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐿𝜃
.                                           
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Thus, 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑎1
𝑞𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
𝑞𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐿𝜃
+ 𝑎2
𝑝𝐿𝜃
𝑞𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐿𝜃
.                                                                
Note however, this strategy cannot be an equilibrium strategy as manager of type 𝑠 = ℎ will 
deviate from 𝐷𝐻  to  𝐷𝐿 because  
𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑠 = ℎ] = (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)(𝑎1
𝑞𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
𝑞𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐿𝜃
+ 𝑎2
𝑝𝐿𝜃
𝑞𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐿𝜃
) + 𝑝𝐻ℎ𝑎3  
> (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)𝑎1 + 𝑝𝐻ℎ𝑎3 = 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻, 𝑠 = ℎ].  
Case 5: Manager of type 𝜎 = 0 or 𝑠 = ℎ discloses 𝐷𝐿, and all other types disclose 𝐷𝐻. 
In this case 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑎1, 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻] = 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻, 𝑅𝐻] = 𝑎3, and  𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿] =
𝑎1𝑝(𝑎1|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿) + 𝑎2𝑝(𝑎2|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿) = 𝑎1
(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐿𝜃
+ 𝑎2
𝑝𝐿𝜃
(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐿𝜃
 .  Note 
however, this strategy cannot be an equilibrium strategy as manager of type 𝑠 = 𝑙 will deviate 
from 𝐷𝐻 to 𝐷𝐿  because 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑠 = 𝑙] = (1 − 𝑝𝐻𝑙)𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿] + 𝑝𝐻𝑙𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻]  
= (1 − 𝑝𝐻𝑙)(𝑎1
(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐿𝜃
+ 𝑎2
𝑝𝐿𝜃
(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐿𝜃
) + 𝑝𝐻𝑙𝑎3  
> (1 − 𝑝𝐻𝑙)𝑎1 + 𝑝𝐻𝑙𝑎3  = (1 − 𝑝𝐻𝑙)𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿] + 𝑝𝐻𝑙𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐻] = 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻, 𝑠 = ℎ].  
Case 6: Manager of type  𝜎 = 1 discloses 𝐷𝐻, and all other types disclose 𝐷𝐿.  
We denote this strategy as “sanitization strategy.”  
Note in this case {𝐷𝐻, 𝑅𝐿} is on off-equilibrium path. As will be clear shortly, the off-
equilibrium belief that supports this equilibrium is 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿] ≤ 𝑎1(1 − 𝜃) + 𝑎2𝜃, an 
assumption that we maintain.  
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In this case, 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐻] = 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻] = 𝑎3, and 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑎1𝑝(𝑎1|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿) +
𝑎2𝑝(𝑎2|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿) = 𝑎1(1 − 𝜃) + 𝑎2𝜃 since 𝑝(𝑎1|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿) =
𝑝(𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿|𝑎1)𝑝(𝑎1)
𝑝(𝐷𝐿, 𝑅𝐿|𝑎1)𝑝(𝑎1)+𝑝(𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿|𝑎2)𝑝(𝑎2)
=
1×𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
1×𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+1×𝑝𝐿𝜃
= 1 − 𝜃. 
Manager of type 𝜎 = 1 knows that he is of 𝑎3, and he is indifferent between 𝐷𝐻 and 𝐷𝐿 as 
𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐻] = 𝑎3 = 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻].  
Manager of type 𝜎 = 0 knows that he is of 𝑎2, and he prefers 𝐷𝐿 over 𝐷𝐻 as  𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿] =
𝑎1(1 − 𝜃) + 𝑎2𝜃 ≥ 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿] by assumption.  
For manager of type  𝑠 = ℎ ,𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑠 = ℎ] = (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿]+𝑝𝐻ℎ𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻] =
(1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)(𝑎1(1 − 𝜃) + 𝑎2𝜃)+𝑝𝐻ℎ𝑎3 ≥ (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿] + 𝑝𝐻ℎ𝑎3  
= (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿] + 𝑝𝐻ℎ𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻, 𝑅𝐻] =  𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑠 = ℎ].  
For manager of type  𝑠 = 𝑙 , 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑠 = 𝑙] = (1 − 𝑝𝐻𝑙)(𝑎1(1 − 𝜃) + 𝑎2𝜃)+𝑝𝐻𝑙𝑎3 ≥
(1 − 𝑝𝐻𝑙)𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿] + 𝑝𝐻𝑙𝑎3  = 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻, 𝑠 = 𝑙].  
Therefore, the sanitization strategy can be supported when the off-equilibrium belief satisfies 
𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿] ≤ 𝑎1(1 − 𝜃) + 𝑎2𝜃.  
To summarize, there are two pure strategy equilibria. One is the “uninformative equilibrium” 
where voluntary disclosure is completely uninformative (Case 1), and the other is the 
“sanitization equilibrium” (Case 6). We show below that both equilibria can be eliminated 
using the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion. For the “uninformative equilibrium,” suppose that 
every manager type discloses 𝐷𝐿 regardless of his private signal. This results in 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅] =
𝐸[𝑎|𝑅]. But then the manager of type 𝜎 = 0 has an incentive to deviate and disclose 𝐷𝐻 as this 
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type has 𝑎2 > 𝐸[𝑎|𝑅𝐿] . Similar reasoning can be applied to eliminating the equilibrium in 
which 𝐷𝐻 is disclosed.  For the “sanitization equilibrium,” the off-equilibrium message 
{𝐷𝐻, 𝑅𝐿} can only possibly be sent by manager of type 𝜎 = 0, or 𝑠 = ℎ, or 𝑠 = 𝑙. Manager of 
type 𝑠 = ℎ or 𝑠 = 𝑙 has no incentive to deviate, so this message, if sent, must come from 
manager of type 𝜎 = 0. This results in 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑎2 > 𝑎1(1 − 𝜃) + 𝑎2𝜃. We thus 
conclude that both pure strategy equilibria can be eliminated by the intuitive criterion. Q.E.D. 
When introducing the reporting discretion, the number of manager’s possible strategies 
increases.  Before proving Proposition 2 that characterizes all the possible pure strategy 
equilibria under 𝑃(𝐷𝐻) ≥ 𝑃(𝐷𝐿), we first state and prove three lemmas, which restrict the 
possible strategies that the manager can adopt.  Let 𝑈𝑡𝑣 ≡ 𝐸[?̃? + 𝜆 𝑎|𝐷𝑡, 𝑅𝑣] be the manager’s 
payoff at 𝐷𝑡 and 𝑅𝑣, for 𝑡, 𝑣 = 𝐻, 𝐿.  
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium, it is not feasible for manager of type  𝜎 = 1 or 𝜎 = 0 to disclose 
𝐷𝐻, while manager of type 𝑠 = ℎ or 𝑠 = 𝑙  to disclose 𝐷𝐿; and vice versa. 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
We present the proof for the first part (the proof for the second part is essentially the same). 
Suppose manager of type 𝜎 = 1 or 𝜎 = 0 discloses 𝐷𝐻 while manager of type 𝑠 = ℎ or 𝑠 = 𝑙 
discloses 𝐷𝐿. This implies that 𝑈𝐻𝐻 > 𝑈𝐿𝐻 and 𝑈𝐻𝐿 > 𝑈𝐿𝐿. But then manager of type 𝑠 = ℎ or 
𝑠 = 𝑙 will not choose 𝐷𝐿 as choosing 𝐷𝐻 becomes a dominant strategy.  Q.E.D. 
Note that Lemma 2 implies that we can focus on strategies where all types of manager disclose 
𝐷𝐻, or all types of manager disclose 𝐷𝐿, or manager of type 𝜎 = 1 discloses 𝐷𝐻 and manager of 
type 𝜎 = 0 discloses 𝐷𝐿.  
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Lemma 3 If any two or more manager types issue the same voluntary disclosure, then it must 
be the case that: either all these manager types issuing the same voluntary disclosure manage 
earnings upward when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿 (and do not manage earnings when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻), or none of these 
manager types manages earnings regardless of 𝑥. In other words, it cannot be the case that one 
type of manager manage earnings upward but another type does not for 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿 when the same 
voluntary disclosure is made by these types.  
Proof of Lemma 3: 
Suppose not. Then there exists an equilibrium where two manager types make the same 
voluntary disclosure, but one type manages earnings upward and the other does not for 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿. 
We present reasoning for one case. Suppose that manager of types 𝜎 = 0 and 𝑠 = ℎ discloses 
𝐷𝐿, and while type 𝜎 = 0  manages earnings upward, type 𝑠 = ℎ  does not when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿. This 
implies that 𝛿𝑈𝐿𝐻 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑈𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝐿𝐿, or equivalently, 𝑈𝐿𝐻 > 𝑈𝐿𝐿. But then the manager of 
type 𝑠 = ℎ would find it beneficial to manage earnings upward when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿 since his expected 
payoff from earnings management is larger, i.e., (1 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1 − 𝛿))𝑈𝐿𝐻 + (1 −
𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1 − 𝛿)𝑈𝐿𝐿 > 𝑝𝐻ℎ𝑈𝐿𝐻 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)𝑈𝐿𝐿.  
All other feasible cases can be proved analogously.  Q.E.D. 
Lemma 4 In any pure strategy equilibrium, the manager engages in upward earnings 
management when  𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿. 
Proof of Lemma 4:  
Suppose not. Then there exists at least one pure strategy equilibrium in which at least one type 
of manager does not manage earnings upward when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿. This implies that either 𝑈𝐻𝐻 <
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𝑈𝐻𝐿 or 𝑈𝐿𝐻 < 𝑈𝐿𝐿 or both. Suppose 𝑈𝐻𝐻 < 𝑈𝐻𝐿. This implies that the manager who voluntarily 
discloses 𝐷𝐻 can benefit from managing earnings downward. However, this cannot be true 
because if 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻, he knows that he is of 𝑎3, which is larger than the average ability of  pooling 
with other lower types by managing earnings downward. In addition, 𝐸[?̃?|𝐷𝐻, 𝑅𝐻] = 𝑥𝐻 given 
that the manager who discloses 𝐷𝐻 manages earnings downward, but does not manage earnings 
upward. We therefore have a contradiction. The case 𝑈𝐿𝐻 < 𝑈𝐿𝐿 can be proved analogously. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
We solve for the equilibrium using a similar procedure to that used in the proof of Proposition 
1. We characterize all possible strategy profiles for all manager types that satisfy both 𝑃(𝐷𝐻) ≥
𝑃(𝐷𝐿) and Lemmas 2 to 4, and derive expressions for  𝑈𝑡𝑣 for 𝑡, 𝑣 = 𝐿, 𝐻 assuming each 
feasible strategy profile is supported in equilibrium. We finally check the constraints that must 
be satisfied to support the strategy profile in equilibrium. If the constraints are not consistent 
with each other, then the conjectured strategy profile cannot be an equilibrium strategy profile. 
We at times go directly to the final step when it is obvious that regardless of the expression for 
 𝑈𝑡𝑣, the constraints cannot be consistent with each other.  
Lemma 2 implies that manager of type  𝜎 = 1  (𝜎 =0) chooses 𝐷𝐻 (𝐷𝐿). Lemma 3 shows that 
manager types that issue the same voluntary disclosure also choose the same earnings 
management strategy (i.e, all or no manage types). Lemma 4 indicates that managing earnings 
downward can never be an equilibrium solution.  Thus there are seven pure strategy profiles 
that are potentially feasible to the manager: 
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Case 1: No type engages in any upward earnings management. This brings us back to 
Proposition 1 which shows that no pure strategy equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion.  
Case 2: Manager of type  𝜎 = 1 chooses 𝐷𝐻 and all other types choose 𝐷𝐿. The manager who 
chooses  𝐷𝐿 manages earnings upward when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿, and do not manage earnings when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻. 
We show this strategy can be sustained in equilibrium and denote this equilibrium as 
“sanitization with management equilibrium” since the voluntary disclosure strategy is the 
sanitization strategy. Then we demonstrate how it can be eliminated via intuitive criterion. 
This strategy profile implies that 𝑈𝐻𝐻 = 𝑥𝐻 + 𝜆𝑎3. Also {𝐷𝐻, 𝑅𝐿} is on off-equilibrium path 
and as will become clear later, the off-equilibrium beliefs that support this equilibrium are 
𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆𝑎1 ≤ 𝑈𝐻𝐿 < 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆(𝑎1(1 − 𝜃) + 𝑎2𝜃).  
Further, 𝑈𝐿𝐿 = 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆(𝑎1(1 − 𝜃) + 𝑎2𝜃) since 𝑝(𝑎1|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿) =
𝑝(𝐷𝐿 ,  𝑅𝐿|𝑎1)𝑝(𝑎1)
𝑝(𝐷𝐿,  𝑅𝐿|𝑎1)𝑝(𝑎1)+𝑝(𝐷𝐿 ,  𝑅𝐿|𝑎2)𝑝(𝑎2)
=
𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐿𝜃
= 1 − 𝜃,and, 𝑈𝐿𝐻 = 𝐸[?̃?|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻] +
𝜆𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻] = 𝑥𝐻
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿
+ 𝑥𝐿
𝛿𝑝𝐿
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿
 +𝜆(𝑎1
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿
+ 𝑎2
𝛿𝑝𝐿𝜃
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿
+
𝑎3
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿
). 
For this equilibrium to be sustainable, the following condition must be met:  
𝑈𝐻𝐻 − 𝑈𝐿𝐻 <
(1−𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1−𝛿)
1−(1−𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1−𝛿)
(𝑈𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝐻𝐿), or, equivalently,  
(𝑥𝐻 − 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆(𝑎3 − 𝑎2))
𝛿𝑝𝐿
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿
+ 𝜆(𝑎2 − 𝑎1)
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿
<
(1−𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1−𝛿)
1−(1−𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1−𝛿)
(𝑈𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝐻𝐿). 
It can be shown that 𝑈𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝐻𝐿 > 0. Thus, the proper off-equilibrium belief to sustain this 
equilibrium is that 𝑈𝐻𝐿 < 𝑈𝐿𝐿 = 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆(𝑎1(1 − 𝜃) + 𝑎2𝜃). Note that since the lowest possible 
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type is 𝑎1, 𝑈𝐻𝐿 ≥ 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆𝑎1. We use the off-equilibrium belief that 𝑈𝐻𝐿 = 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆𝑎1 to construct 
conditions that would support this equilibrium: (𝑥𝐻 − 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆(𝑎3 − 𝑎2))
𝛿𝑝𝐿
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿
+
𝜆(𝑎2 − 𝑎1)
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿
<
(1−𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1−𝛿)
1−(1−𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1−𝛿)
𝜃𝜆(𝑎2 − 𝑎1)                                                          (A1) 
However any off-equilibrium belief that satisfies 𝑈𝐻𝐿 < 𝑈𝐿𝐿 = 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆(𝑎1(1 − 𝜃) + 𝑎2𝜃) also 
renders this equilibrium being eliminated by the intuitive criterion. To see this,note that  the off-
equilibrium message {𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿} can only be possibly sent by manager of type 𝜎 = 0, or 𝑠 = ℎ, or 
𝑠 = 𝑙. Condition (A1) indicates that manager of type 𝑠 = ℎ or 𝑠 = 𝑙 has no incentive to deviate 
to 𝐷𝐻, thus this message, if observed, must come from manager of type 𝜎 = 0. This means 
𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑎2 > 𝑎1(1 − 𝜃) + 𝑎2𝜃 and 𝑈𝐻𝐿 = 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆 𝑎2 > 𝑈𝐿𝐿. We thus conclude that this 
equilibrium can be eliminated by the intuitive criterion. 
Case 3: Manager of type 𝜎 = 0 or 𝑠 = 𝑙 discloses 𝐷𝐿 and does not engage in earnings 
management. Manager of type  𝜎 = 1 or  𝑠 = ℎ discloses 𝐷𝐻 and manages earnings upward 
when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿 but not downward when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻.  
Note this case requires 𝑈𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝐿𝐻. However, given the conjectured strategy, 𝑈𝐿𝐿 = 𝑥𝐿 +
𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿] whereas 𝑈𝐿𝐻 = 𝑥𝐻 + 𝑎3 > 𝑈𝐿𝐿. Thus, the conjectured strategy cannot be an 
equilibrium strategy.  
Case 4: Manager of type 𝜎 = 0 or 𝑠 = 𝑙 discloses 𝐷𝐿 and manages earnings upward when 𝑥 =
𝑥𝐿 but not downward when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻. Manager of type 𝜎 = 1 or 𝑠 = ℎ discloses 𝐷𝐻 and does not 
engage in upward earnings management.  
For this conjectured strategy to be sustained in equilibrium, we need 𝑈𝐻𝐻 > 𝑈𝐻𝐿 so that 
manager of type 𝜎 = 1 will not manage earnings downward. But then manager of type  𝑠 = ℎ 
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will have an incentive to manage earnings upward because (1 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1 − 𝛿))𝑈𝐻𝐻 +
(1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1 − 𝛿)𝑈𝐻𝐿 > 𝑝𝐻ℎ𝑈𝐻𝐻 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻ℎ)𝑈𝐻𝐿. Thus, the conjectured strategy cannot be an 
equilibrium strategy. 
Case 5:  Manager of type 𝜎 = 0 or  𝑠 = 𝑙 discloses 𝐷𝐿 and manages earnings upward when 𝑥 =
𝑥𝐿 but not downward when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻. Manager of type  𝜎 = 1 or 𝑠 = ℎ discloses 𝐷𝐻 and 
manages earnings upward when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿 but not downward when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻. Since all manager 
types manage earnings upward when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿,  𝐸[?̃?|𝐷𝑡 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑥𝐿 for 𝑡 = 𝐿, 𝐻.  
Based on the manager’s strategy, {𝐷𝐻, 𝑅𝐿} can only occur for manager of type 𝑎1. Thus  
𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑎1, and, 𝑈𝐻𝐿 = 𝐸[?̃? + 𝜆𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆𝑎1.  Further, {𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿} can only occur 
for manager of type 𝑎1 or 𝑎2. Thus, 𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑎1𝑝(𝑎1|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿) + 𝑎2𝑝(𝑎2|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿). By 
Bayes’ Rule, (𝑎1|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿) =
𝑝(𝐷𝐿 ,  𝑅𝐿|𝑎1)𝑝(𝑎1)
𝑝(𝐷𝐿 ,  𝑅𝐿|𝑎1)𝑝(𝑎1)+𝑝(𝐷𝐿 ,  𝑅𝐿|𝑎2)𝑝(𝑎2)
 =
(1−𝛿)𝑞𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
(1−𝛿)𝑞𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+(1−𝛿)𝑝𝐿𝜃
=
𝑞(1−𝜃)
𝑞(1−𝜃)+𝜃
.  Thus we have:𝐸[𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑎1
𝑞(1−𝜃)
𝑞(1−𝜃)+𝜃
+ 𝑎2
𝜃
𝑞(1−𝜃)+𝜃
, and, 𝑈𝐿𝐿 =
𝐸[?̃? + 𝜆𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐿] = 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆(𝑎1
𝑞(1−𝜃)
𝑞(1−𝜃)+𝜃
+ 𝑎2
𝜃
𝑞(1−𝜃)+𝜃
). 
Similarly, 𝑈𝐿𝐻 ≡ 𝐸[?̃? + 𝜆𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻] = 𝑥𝐻
(1−𝑞)(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻
(1−𝑞)(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿(𝜃+(1−𝜃)𝑞)𝑝𝐿
+
𝑥𝐿
𝛿(𝜃+(1−𝜃)𝑞)𝑝𝐿
(1−𝑞)(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿(𝜃+(1−𝜃)𝑞)𝑝𝐿
+              𝜆𝑎1
𝑞𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
𝑞𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝛿𝑝𝐿𝜃+(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐻(1−𝜃)
+
𝜆𝑎2
𝛿𝑝𝐿𝜃
𝑞𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝛿𝑝𝐿𝜃+(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐻(1−𝜃)
+              𝜆𝑎3
(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐻(1−𝜃)
𝑞𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝛿𝑝𝐿𝜃+(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐻(1−𝜃)
, and, 
𝑈𝐻𝐻 ≡ 𝐸[?̃? + 𝜆𝑎|𝐷𝐻 , 𝑅𝐻] =              𝑥𝐻
(1−(1−𝑞)(1−𝜃))𝑝𝐻
(1−(1−𝑞)(1−𝜃))𝑝𝐻+𝛿(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐿
+
𝑥𝐿
𝛿(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐿
(1−(1−𝑞)(1−𝜃))𝑝𝐻+𝛿(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐿
 +              𝜆𝑎1
(1−𝑞)𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
(1−𝑞)𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑞𝑝𝐻(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐻𝜃
+
𝜆𝑎3
𝑞𝑝𝐻(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐻𝜃
(1−𝑞)𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑞𝑝𝐻(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐻𝜃
.         
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In order for this equilibrium to be sustainable, to the following conditions must be satisfied:   
(1−𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1−𝛿)
1−(1−𝑝𝐻ℎ)(1−𝛿)
(𝑈𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝐻𝐿) < 𝑈𝐻𝐻 − 𝑈𝐿𝐻 <
(1−𝑝𝐻𝑙)(1−𝛿)
1−(1−𝑝𝐻𝑙)(1−𝛿)
(𝑈𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝐻𝐿).                     (A2) 
Inserting the expressions of 𝑈𝐻𝐻, 𝑈𝐻𝐿 , 𝑈𝐿𝐻 and 𝑈𝐿𝐿, 𝑝𝐻ℎ and 𝑝𝐻𝑙  into (A2), we have:  
𝜆(𝑎2 − 𝑎1)
(1−𝛿)𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)+𝑝𝐻𝑞
𝜃
𝑞(1−𝜃)+𝜃
<  
(𝑥𝐻 − 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆(𝑎3 − 𝑎2))
𝛿𝑝𝐿𝑝𝐻(2𝑞−1+2𝜃(1−𝑞))
(𝑝𝐻(𝑞+𝜃)−𝑝𝐻𝑞𝜃+𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)(1−𝜃))((1−𝑞)(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿(𝑞+𝜃−𝑞𝜃))
  
+𝜆(𝑎2 − 𝑎1)
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)(−𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)𝜃+𝑝𝐻(𝑞(2−𝜃)−(1−𝜃)))
(𝑝𝐻(𝑞+𝜃)−𝑝𝐻𝑞𝜃+𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)(1−𝜃))((1−𝑞)(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿(𝑞+𝜃−𝑞𝜃))
  
< 𝜆(𝑎2 − 𝑎1)
(1−𝛿)𝑝𝐿𝑞
𝛿𝑝𝐿𝑞+𝑝𝐻(1−𝑞)
𝜃
𝑞(1−𝜃)+𝜃
. 
We denote this equilibrium as “separation with management equilibrium” since in this 
equilibrium, 𝐷𝐿 and 𝐷𝐻 convey relatively bad and good news respectively.  
Case 6: Manager of type 𝜎 = 0 discloses 𝐷𝐿 and manages earnings upward. All other manager 
types disclose 𝐷𝐻 and do not manage earnings upward.  
This conjectured strategy cannot be sustained in equilibrium as it requires 𝑈𝐻𝐻 > 𝑈𝐻𝐿 so that 
manager of type 𝜎 = 1 has no incentive to manage earnings downward. However, this gives 
manager of type  𝑠 = ℎ or 𝑠 = 𝑙  incentive to manage earnings upward.  
Case 7: Manager of type 𝜎 = 0 discloses and discloses 𝐷𝐿 and manages earnings upward. All 
other manager types disclose 𝐷𝐻 and manages earnings upward when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿 but not downward 
when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻. This conjectured equilibrium strategy profile results in the following payoffs to 
the manager: 
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𝑈𝐻𝐿 = 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆𝑎1; 𝑈𝐿𝐿 = 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆𝑎2; 𝑈𝐿𝐻 = 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆𝑎2; and,  𝑈𝐻𝐻 = 𝑥𝐻
𝑝𝐻
𝑝𝐻+𝛿(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐿
+
𝑥𝐿
𝛿(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐿
𝑝𝐻+𝛿(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐿
+ 𝜆(𝑎1
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐻
+ 𝑎3
𝑝𝐻
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐻
). 
For this conjectured strategy to be sustained in equilibrium, the following conditions must be 
satisfied: 
(1−𝑝𝐻𝑙)(1−𝛿)
1−(1−𝑝𝐻𝑙)(1−𝛿)
(𝑈𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝐻𝐿) < 𝑈𝐻𝐻 − 𝑈𝐿𝐻 <
1−𝛿
𝛿
(𝑈𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝐻𝐿), or, equivalently, 
(1−𝑝𝐻𝑙)(1−𝛿)
1−(1−𝑝𝐻𝑙)(1−𝛿)
𝜆(𝑎2 − 𝑎1) < (𝑥𝐻 − 𝑥𝐿 − 𝜆(𝑎2 − 𝑎1))
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐻
+ 𝜆(𝑎3 − 𝑎2)
𝑝𝐻
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐻
 <
1−𝛿
𝛿
𝜆(𝑎2 − 𝑎1). 
We denote this equilibrium as “reverse sanitization with management equilibrium” since in this 
equilibrium, the manager discloses the upper bound of his private information, which is exactly 
opposite to his disclosure strategy in the “sanitization with management equilibrium”. 
This equilibrium, however, fails the criterion of invariance to deletion of redundant strategies 
proposed in Govindan and Wilson (2006). Since 𝑈𝐿𝐿 = 𝑈𝐿𝐻, managing earnings upward when 
𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿 for manager of type 𝜎 = 0 is a redundant strategy. Eliminating this strategy results in 
{𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻} being off-equilibrium. The manager of type 𝜎 = 1 will then have an incentive to 
deviate and send the off-equilibrium message 𝐷𝐿 since  𝑈𝐿𝐻 = 𝐸[?̃? + 𝜆𝑎|𝐷𝐿 , 𝑅𝐻] = 𝑥𝐻 +
𝜆𝑎3 > 𝑈𝐻𝐻 .  
To summarize, in addition to the “uninformative equilibrium”, under certain conditions, we 
have possibly the following three pure strategy informative equilibria.  
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1. a “sanitization with management equilibrium” where the manager discloses 𝐷𝐻 
when observing 𝜎 = 1 and  discloses 𝐷𝐿 otherwise, and manages earnings up for 
𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿, if (𝑥𝐻 − 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆(𝑎3 − 𝑎2))
𝛿𝑝𝐿
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝑝𝑝𝐿
+ 𝜆(𝑎2 − 𝑎1)
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿
  
       < 𝜆(𝑎2 − 𝑎1)
(1−𝛿)(1−𝑝𝐻)(1−𝑞)
𝛿(1−𝑝𝐻)(1−𝑞)+𝑝𝐻𝑞
𝜃; 
2. a “separation with management equilibrium” where the manager discloses 𝐷𝐻 when 
observing  𝜎 = 1 or 𝑠 = ℎ, and discloses 𝐷𝐿 otherwise, and manages earnings up 
for 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿, if 𝜆(𝑎2 − 𝑎1)
(1−𝛿)(1−𝑝𝐻)(1−𝑞)
𝛿(1−𝑝𝐻)(1−𝑞)+𝑝𝐻𝑞
𝜃
𝑞(1−𝜃)+𝜃
<  
                    (𝑥𝐻 − 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆(𝑎3 − 𝑎2)) ×
𝛿𝑝𝐿𝑝𝐻(2𝑞−1+2𝜃(1−𝑞))
(𝑝𝐻(𝑞+𝜃)−𝑝𝐻𝑞𝜃+𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)(1−𝜃))((1−𝑞)(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿(𝑞+𝜃−𝑞𝜃))
  
                   +𝜆(𝑎2 − 𝑎1) ×
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)(−𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)𝜃+𝑝𝐻(𝑞(2−𝜃)−(1−𝜃)))
(𝑝𝐻(𝑞+𝜃)−𝑝𝐻𝑞𝜃+𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)(1−𝜃))((1−𝑞)(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿(𝑞+𝜃−𝑞𝜃))
  
                   < 𝜆(𝑎2 − 𝑎1)
(1−𝛿)(1−𝑝𝐻)𝑞
𝛿(1−𝑝𝐻)𝑞+𝑝𝐻(1−𝑞)
𝜃
𝑞(1−𝜃)+𝜃
 ; and finally, 
3. a “reverse sanitization with management equilibrium” where the manager discloses 
𝐷𝐿 when observing 𝜎 = 0, and discloses 𝐷𝐻 otherwise, and manages earnings up 
for 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐿, if      𝜆(𝑎2 − 𝑎1)
(1−𝛿)(1−𝑝𝐻)𝑞
𝛿(1−𝑝𝐻)𝑞+𝑝𝐻(1−𝑞)
 < (𝑥𝐻 − 𝑥𝐿 + 𝜆(𝑎3 −
𝑎2))
𝑝𝐻
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐻
− 𝜆(𝑎2 − 𝑎1)
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐻
  <
1−𝛿
𝛿
𝜆(𝑎2 − 𝑎1).  
Among these three pure strategy equilibria, equilibria 1) and 3) can be eliminated using 
proper equilibrium selection criteria.  
Next we derive the conditions for the existence of these three equilibria. Denote 
𝑥𝐻−𝑥𝐿+𝜆(𝑎3−𝑎2)
𝜆(𝑎2−𝑎1)
= 𝑘 > 0.  
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For  the “sanitization with management equilibrium,”  the condition to sustain this 
equilibrium can be rewritten as(𝑘 + 1 − 𝜃)
𝛿𝑝𝐿
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿
<
(1−𝛿)𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)+𝑝𝐻𝑞
𝜃.    (A3) 
The left hand side (LHS) of (A3) increases in 𝛿 and the right hand side (RHS) of (A3) 
decreases in 𝛿. When 𝛿 → 0, the LHS approaches zero, which is smaller than the RHS. 
Similarly, when 𝛿 → 1, the RHS approaches zero, which is smaller than the LHS. 
Therefore, there exists a 𝛿𝑠𝑚
∗ ∈ (0,1) s.t. the “sanitization with management” equilibrium is 
sustainable when 𝛿 < 𝛿𝑠𝑚
∗ .  
For the “reverse sanitization with management equilibrium,” the equilibrium conditions can 
be rewritten as 
(1−𝑝𝐻𝑙)(1−𝛿)
1−(1−𝑝𝐻𝑙)(1−𝛿)
< 𝑘
𝑝𝐻
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐻
−
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐻
<
1−𝛿
𝛿
, which is equivalent to 
1
1−(1−𝑝𝐻𝑙)(1−𝛿)
< (𝑘 + 1)
𝑝𝐻
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)+𝑝𝐻
<
1
𝛿
. We can further write the above condition as 
𝑝𝐻(1−𝑞)
𝑝𝐻(1−𝑞)+𝑞(1−𝑝𝐻)
+
𝑞(1−𝑝𝐻)
𝑝𝐻(1−𝑞)+𝑞(1−𝑝𝐻)
𝛿 >
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
𝑝𝐻(𝑘+1)
+
1
𝑘+1
> 𝛿. 
 Since the above two equilibria can be eliminated, we focus on the “separation with 
management equilibrium.” We rewrite the equilibrium condition as  
𝐴1(𝛿) ≡
(1−𝛿)(1−𝑝𝐻)(1−𝑞)
𝛿(1−𝑝𝐻)(1−𝑞)+𝑝𝐻𝑞
𝜃
𝑞(1−𝜃)+𝜃
<  
            𝑘
𝛿𝑝𝐿𝑝𝐻(2𝑞−1+2𝜃(1−𝑞))
(𝑝𝐻(𝑞+𝜃)−𝑝𝐻𝑞𝜃+𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)(1−𝜃))((1−𝑞)(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿(𝑞+𝜃−𝑞𝜃))
  
            +
𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)(−𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)𝜃+𝑝𝐻(𝑞(2−𝜃)−(1−𝜃)))
(𝑝𝐻(𝑞+𝜃)−𝑝𝐻𝑞𝜃+𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)(1−𝜃))((1−𝑞)(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿(𝑞+𝜃−𝑞𝜃))
≡ 𝐴2(𝛿)  
            <
(1−𝛿)(1−𝑝𝐻)𝑞
𝛿(1−𝑝𝐻)𝑞+𝑝𝐻(1−𝑞)
𝜃
𝑞(1−𝜃)+𝜃
≡ 𝐴3(𝛿)                                                                 (A4)  
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It can be verified that when 𝛿 = 0, 𝐴2(0) = 0 < 𝐴1(0) and 𝐴2(0) = 0 < 𝐴3(0); when 𝛿 = 1 
and 𝑝𝐻 >
𝜃(1−𝑞)
𝜃+(1−𝜃)(2𝑞−1)
 (i.e., −𝛿𝑝𝐿(1 − 𝑞)𝜃 + 𝑝𝐻(𝑞(2 − 𝜃) − (1 − 𝜃)) > 0), 𝐴2(1) > 0 =
𝐴1(1) and 𝐴2(1) > 0 = 𝐴3(1).  Note that 𝑞 >
1
2
 implies 𝑝𝐻𝑞
2 > 𝑝𝐻(1 − 𝑞)
2, which in turn 
implies that 
(1−𝛿)(1−𝑝𝐻)(1−𝑞)
𝛿(1−𝑝𝐻)(1−𝑞)+𝑝𝐻𝑞
<
(1−𝛿)(1−𝑝𝐻)𝑞
𝛿(1−𝑝𝐻)𝑞+𝑝𝐻(1−𝑞)
 for any 𝛿 ∈ [0,1). This means 
𝐴3(𝛿) > 𝐴1(𝛿) for any 𝛿 ∈ [0,1). By continuity, there must exist some 𝛿
∗ ∈ (0,1) such that 
𝐴1(𝛿
∗) < 𝐴2(𝛿
∗) < 𝐴3(𝛿
∗).  This proves part i). 
Further: (1) 𝐴1(𝛿) and 𝐴3(𝛿) decrease in 𝛿, and 𝐴2(𝛿) increases in 𝛿 when 𝑘 is sufficiently 
large and 
𝑝𝐻
1−𝑝𝐻
≥
1
2
 – this can be shown since the first term in 𝐴2(𝛿), i.e., 
𝛿𝑝𝐿𝑝𝐻(2𝑞−1+2𝜃(1−𝑞))
(𝑝𝐻(𝑞+𝜃)−𝑝𝐻𝑞𝜃+𝛿𝑝𝐿(1−𝑞)(1−𝜃))((1−𝑞)(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝛿𝑝𝐿(𝑞+𝜃−𝑞𝜃))
 is increasing in 𝛿 when 𝛿 <
𝑝𝐻
2
(1−𝑝𝐻)2
, 
which is automatically satisfied when 𝑝𝐻 ≥
1
2
 ; (2) 𝐴1(𝛿) < 𝐴3(𝛿) ∀𝛿; (3) when 𝛿 = 0, 
𝐴2(𝛿) < 𝐴1(𝛿) and 𝐴2(𝛿) < 𝐴3(𝛿); and (4) when 𝛿 = 1, 𝐴2(𝛿) > 0 = 𝐴1(𝛿) and 
𝐴2(𝛿) > 0 = 𝐴3(𝛿). By continuity there must exist some 𝛿, 𝛿̅ ∈ (0,1) and 𝛿 < 𝛿̅ such that 
𝐴1(𝛿) = 𝐴2(𝛿) and 𝐴2(𝛿) = 𝐴3(𝛿). This implies that 𝐴1(𝛿) < 𝐴2(𝛿) < 𝐴3(𝛿) for 𝛿 ∈ (𝛿, 𝛿). 
This proves part ii). 
To prove part iii), note that when 𝑝𝐻=0, 𝐴1(𝛿) = 𝐴3(𝛿) > 0 = 𝐴2(𝛿). Thus (A4) is violated. 
By continuity this equilibrium does not exist when 𝑝𝐻 is sufficiently small.  Q.E.D.  
Proof of Proposition 3: 
The (inverse of) price informativeness metric can be written as: 
𝐸((𝑃(𝐷) − 𝑥)2) = ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑖 𝑝(𝐷𝑗|𝑥𝑖){𝑃(𝐷𝑗|𝑥𝑖) − 𝑥𝑖}
2
𝑗𝑖 for i, j = L, H. 
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First we examine the “sanitization equilibrium” characterized in Proposition 1, which is the 
most informative equilibrium when no reporting discretion is allowed.  
We first derive the expressions for 𝑃(𝐷𝐿) and 𝑃(𝐷𝐻).  
Based on the sanitization strategy,  𝐷𝐻 is perfectly informative that 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐻. Thus 𝑃(𝐷𝐻) = 𝑥𝐻.  
To calculate 𝑃(𝐷𝐿), we need to calculate 𝑝(𝑥𝐻|𝐷𝐿). By Bayes’ Rule, we have 
𝑝(𝑥𝐻|𝐷𝐿) =
𝑝(𝐷𝐿|𝑥𝐻)𝑝𝐻
𝑝(𝐷𝐿|𝑥𝐻)𝑝𝐻+𝑝(𝐷𝐿|𝑥𝐿)𝑝𝐿
 =
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝑝𝐿
, and thus, 𝑃(𝐷𝐿) = 𝑥𝐻
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝑝𝐿
+
𝑥𝐿
𝑝𝐿
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝑝𝐿
.  
Inserting the expressions of 𝑃(𝐷𝐻) and 𝑃(𝐷𝐿) into the expression of 𝐸((𝑃(𝐷) − 𝑥)
2), we have 
𝐸𝑛((𝑃(𝐷) − 𝑥)2) = 𝑝𝐻(1 − 𝜃)(𝑥𝐻 − 𝑃(𝐷𝐿))
2
+ 𝑝𝐿(𝑥𝐿 − 𝑃(𝐷𝐿))
2
=
𝑝𝐻𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝑝𝐿
(𝑥𝐻 − 𝑥𝐿)
2, 
where the superscript 𝑛 refers to “no discretion allowed”.  
Similarly, for the “separation with management equilibrium” characterized in Proposition 2, 
𝑃(𝐷𝐻) = 𝑥𝐻
(𝜃+(1−𝜃)𝑞)𝑝𝐻
(𝜃+(1−𝜃)𝑞)𝑝𝐻+(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐿
+ 𝑥𝐿
(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐿
(𝜃+(1−𝜃)𝑞)𝑝𝐻+(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐿
, and,   
𝑃(𝐷𝐿) = 𝑥𝐻
(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐻
(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐻+(𝜃+(1−𝜃)𝑞)𝑝𝐿
+ 𝑥𝐿
(𝜃+(1−𝜃)𝑞)𝑝𝐿
(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐻+(𝜃+(1−𝜃)𝑞)𝑝𝐿
. 
Inserting the expressions of 𝑃(𝐷𝐻) and 𝑃(𝐷𝐿) into the expression of 𝐸((𝑃(𝐷) − 𝑥)
2), we have: 
𝐸𝑑((𝑃(𝐷) − 𝑥)2) = (𝑝𝐻𝜃 + 𝑝𝐻(1 − 𝜃)𝑞)(𝑥𝐻 − 𝑃(𝐷𝐻))
2
+ 𝑝𝐻(1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑞)(𝑥𝐻 − 𝑃(𝐷𝐿))
2
  
+(𝑝𝐿𝜃 + 𝑝𝐿(1 − 𝜃)𝑞)(𝑥𝐿 − 𝑃(𝐷𝐿))
2
+ 𝑝𝐿(1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑞)(𝑥𝐿 − 𝑃(𝐷𝐻))
2
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=
𝑝𝐻𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)(𝜃+(1−𝜃)𝑞)
((𝜃+(1−𝜃)𝑞)𝑝𝐻+(1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐿)((1−𝜃)(1−𝑞)𝑝𝐻+(𝜃+(1−𝜃)𝑞)𝑝𝐿)
(𝑥𝐻 − 𝑥𝐿)
2. 
Denote 𝑡 = (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑞) <
1
2
(1 − 𝜃), we can then write 𝐸𝑑((𝑃(𝐷) − 𝑥)2) as  
𝐸𝑑((𝑃(𝐷) − 𝑥)2) = 𝑝𝐻𝑝𝐿(𝑥𝐻 − 𝑥𝐿)
2𝑓(𝑡) where𝑓(𝑡) =
𝑡(1−𝑡)
(𝑡+(1−2𝑡)𝑝𝐻)(1−𝑡−(1−2𝑡)𝑝𝐻)
 . It can be 
shown that 𝑓′(𝑡) =
𝑝𝐻(1−𝑝𝐻)(1−2𝑡)
(𝑡+(1−2𝑡)𝑝𝐻)2(1−𝑡−(1−2𝑡)𝑝𝐻)2
> 0. Thus 𝐸𝑑((𝑃(𝐷) − 𝑥)2) is increasing in 𝑡 
and decreasing in 𝑞. 
When 𝑞 → 1, 𝑡 → 0, 𝐸𝑑((𝑃(𝐷) − 𝑥)2) → 0 < 𝐸𝑛((𝑃(𝐷) − 𝑥)2); 
When 𝑞 →
1
2
 , 𝑡 →
1
2
(1 − 𝜃), 𝐸𝑑((𝑃(𝐷) − 𝑥)2) → 𝑝𝐻𝑝𝐿(𝑥𝐻 − 𝑥𝐿)
2 (1−𝜃)(1+𝜃)
1−(2𝑝𝐻−1)2𝜃2
.  
Thus, when 𝑞 →
1
2
,  𝐸𝑑((𝑃(𝐷) − 𝑥)2) ≤ 𝐸𝑛((𝑃(𝐷) − 𝑥)2) if and only if 
(1+𝜃)
1−(2𝑝𝐻−1)2𝜃2
≤
1
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝑝𝐿
=
1
1−𝜃𝑝𝐻
,  i.e., 𝑝𝐻 ≥
1+𝜃
4𝜃
. 
Therefore, when 𝑝𝐻 ≥
1+𝜃
4𝜃
, voluntary disclosure with discretion in subsequent mandatory 
disclosure is always more informative than the sanitization voluntary disclosure without that 
discretion. When 𝑝𝐻 <
1+𝜃
4𝜃
, there exists a 𝑞∗ ∈ (
1
2
, 1) s.t. voluntary disclosure with discretion in 
subsequent mandatory disclosure is more informative than the sanitization voluntary disclosure 
without that discretion when 𝑞 > 𝑞∗ with 𝑞∗ = 1 −
𝑡∗
1−𝜃
  being defined by the unique solution 𝑡∗ 
to the following equation:
𝑡∗(1−𝑡∗)
(𝑡∗+(1−2𝑡∗)𝑝𝐻)(1−𝑡∗−(1−2𝑡∗)𝑝𝐻)
=
1−𝜃
(1−𝜃)𝑝𝐻+𝑝𝐿
.   Q.E.D. 
 
